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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CATHEDRAL:
PROHIBITING, PURCHASING, AND POSSIBLY
CONDEMNING TOBACCO ADVERTISING
Thomas W. Merrill*

INTRODUCTION

This Article has both theoretical and practical objectives, which are
closely interrelated. The theoretical objective is to develop a framework for
understanding the "transaction structure" of constitutional rights1 By this, I
refer to the different rules that determine when the government may purchase, condemn, or otherwise extinguish constitutional rights. The practical
objective is to consider different options that may be available to the government, as part of a broader effort to reduce the incidence of smoking, to
curtail tobacco advertising that would otherwise be protected under the First
Amendment. It is my hope that the theoretical framework will illuminate
the practical problem. Conversely, however, I also anticipate that consideration of the practical problem will suggest refinements in or limitations on
the theoretical framework.
The transaction structure that applies to constitutional rights includes
four principal options. 2 Sometimes constitutional rights are deemed nonwaivable. Thus, when the courts apply the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to strike down an arrangement in which a constitutional right is
given up in exchange for some government benefit, this may mean that the
right cannot be waived under any circumstances. In other settings-for example, with respect to plea bargaining-the courts have been quite willing
to permit persons to waive their constitutional rights in return for some quid
pro quo like a reduced sentence. In still other settings, most prominently
where contract and property rights are concerned, the government is permitted to condemn constitutionally protected interests without the rightholder's consent upon payment of judicially determined compensation. Finally, there are many circumstances where courts have concluded that the
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am grateful for comments received from Jim Speta and from the participants in Free Speech and Economic Power: A Symposium.
I See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS 27,
289, 301-04 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (using "transaction structure" in an
analogous sense with respect to common-law entitlements).
2 The analysis could no doubt be refined to include other options. See Saul Levmore, Unifying
Remedies: PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2173 (1997) (listing sixteen possible transaction structure rules).
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government has such a strong interest in preventing certain harms that constitutional rights can be overcome by legislative action without consent and
without paying any compensation at all. This is what happens When a right
is said to be trumped by the government's police power.
This typology of transfer rules can be redescribed in terms of the vocabulary introduced by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (hereinafter C&M) to explain different degrees of protection given to common-law
entitlements. 3 The first circumstance, where all transfers are prohibited, reflects what C&M call an "inalienability" rule. The second, where rights
may be sold by the rightsholder but cannot be involuntarily taken, tracks
what C&M label a "property" rule. The third, in which the government can
take rights without the rightsholder's consent upon payment of ex post
compensation, is what C&M call a "liability" rule. Finally, the fourth circumstance, in which the right is extinguished upon a finding that it is
trumped by the police power, would under the C&M framework be a situation of "no entitlement."

In some circumstances, the transactional rules that apply to constitutional rights are reasonably well established. Thus, for example, it is clear
that government employees cannot waive their free speech rights, at least as
to matters unrelated to their government responsibilities; that is, the First
Amendment in these circumstances is protected by an inalienability rule.4
Similarly, we know that criminal defendants can waive their right to a public trial; the Sixth Amendment is in these circumstances protected by a
property rule.5 Likewise, there is no doubt that owners of real estate can
have their property condemned by the government for virtually any plausible reason as long as the government compensates them; the Fifth Amendment here is protected by a liability rule.6 And we know that in certain
circumstances, like shouting fire in a crowded theater or using one's property to commit a nuisance, rights can be trumped without either consent or
compensation; that is, the right gives way to the supervening claims of the
police power. 7
3 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). As more recent commentary has suggested, the different modes of protecting rights should not be regarded as different "remedies" for the
violation of entitlements, but rather as different specifications of the content of entitlements with respect
to the domain of transfer. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights,
95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1345 (1986); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better
View of the Cathedral,83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997).
4 See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
5 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract,101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
6 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
7 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) ("a ban on shouting fire
can be a core exercise of the State's police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet even
our stringent standards for regulation of speech.") (dictum); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (a state may prohibit nuisances and thereby impair the value of property
without violating the Takings Clause).
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But there are other settings-such as the right to engage in commercial
speech-where the appropriate transactional rule or rules is highly uncertain. In filling such gaps or lacunae in the transaction structure, it would be
useful to have a general theoretical framework that would help judges and
other actors identify the relevant variables for determining which transaction rule is appropriate. My first objective in this Article is to contribute to
the development of such a framework.
The second and more practical objective is to consider various options
available to the government in controlling commercial advertising by tobacco companies. The issue has been brought to the fore by a series of unusual efforts outside the normal legislative process to impose new restrictions
on tobacco advertising. These efforts commenced when the federal Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed and then adopted tough regulations limiting tobacco advertising. The FDA had never before in its long
history sought to regulate tobacco advertising. Not surprisingly, the tobacco companies challenged the FDA's advertising regulations in federal
district court in North Carolina as exceeding the FDA's jurisdiction and as
violating the tobacco companies' First Amendment rights.
Without reaching the First Amendment question, both the district court
aild the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FDA had no statutory
authority to regulate tobacco advertising.9 The Supreme Court has recently
granted the government's petition for certiorari seeking review of this decision. If the Court upholds the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco advertising,
then the First Amendment issue would be ripe for consideration by the
lower courts. Alternatively, if the Court holds that the FDA lacks authority
over tobacco, Congress conceivably could respond by enacting legislation
that would confer such authority on the FDA or another federal agency, in
which case federal limitations on tobacco advertising could return either as
part of the legislation or as new or readopted administrative regulations.
Thus, it is not unlikely that courts sometime in the not-too-distant future
will have to decide whether the federal government's interest in discouraging smoking is sufficiently compelling to justify significant curtailments on
tobacco advertising, in other words, whether the right to engage in tobacco
advertising is trumped by the police power.
. In June 1997, while the legal challenges to the FDA's authority were
pending before the Fourth Circuit, a startling development was announced:
the major tobacco companies and many of their adversaries, including state
8 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (proposed August 11, 1995) [hereinafter
FDA NOPR]; Food and Drug Administration, Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (final rule)
[hereinafter FDA FinalReg.]. The regulations are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.1 et seq. (1998).
9 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev'd in
parton other grounds sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d
155 (4th Cir. 1998).
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attorneys general, plaintiffs' lawyers, and certain public health groups, had
entered into a settlement agreement calling for payments totaling $368.5
billion by the tobacco companies over twenty-five years.'0 This so-called
"Global Settlement" also provided for the enactment of federal legislation
that would resolve the scope of the FDA's authority over tobacco,' impose
limits on the companies' annual tort liability from all sources, and impose
significant new advertising and marketing restrictions on the companies.
Recognizing that the advertising restrictions might be vulnerable to a First
Amendment challenge, the settlement also called for the adoption of consent decrees in which the tobacco couipanies promised to abide by the advertising restrictions to be included in legislation. 12 To further protect
against First Amendment interference, the Global Settlement then provided
that the tobacco companies entering into the consent decrees would "expressly waive" any claim that these restrictions violate the federal or state
constitutions. 3 In short, the Global Settlement presupposed that commercial advertising of tobacco products is protected at most by a property rule,
that is, by a right that the tobacco companies are free to bargain away by
contract in return for offsetting benefits that they regard as more valuable,
such as limitations on their tort liability.
The requirement of implementing federal legislation proved to be the
Global Settlement's undoing. Legislators sought to rework the settlement
into something more to their liking; specifically, they sought to increase the
payments required of the tobacco companies while reducing the degree of
tort immunity granted to the companies. In April 1998, the tobacco companies responded by withdrawing their support from the Global Settlement
and launching a public relations campaign to defeat the legislation.' 4 By
June, the publicity campaign began to take effect and the tobacco bill was
killed by the Senate leadership. 5
Nevertheless, the prime movers behind the Global Settlement-the
state attorneys general and the tobacco companies-did not give up. Almost immediately, a new effort commenced to reach a settlement that
would not require federal legislation. 16 In November 1998, a stripped-down
10 See Memorandum of Understanding and Proposed Resolution (visited May 18, 1999)
<http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htnm> [hereinafter Global Settlement].
11 The Global Settlement did not resolve the litigation in the Fourth Circuit over the FDA's proposed regulations, but it did call for the enactment of new federal legislation that would have effectively
mooted the FDA controversy. See id.
"2 Id. at tit. III.B.
13 Id.

14 See David E. Rosenbaum, CigaretteMakers Quit Negotiations on Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
April 9, 1998, atAl.
15 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, The Tobacco Bill: News Analysis; High Risks on Tobacco, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 18, 1998, at Al.

16 See Alison Frankel, After the Smoke Cleared: The Inside Story of Big Tobacco's $206 Billion

Settlement, THE AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 48.
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settlement agreement calling for payments totaling $206 billion was unveiled. 17 This "AG Settlement" rapidly received the assent of all forty-six
attorneys general who had not previously settled with the tobacco companies, as well as the approval of most trial courts overseeing the attorneys
general's suits against the tobacco companies.18 The AG Settlement appears to be well on its way to final approval in all states.
Although it does not require the enactment of federal legislation, the
AG Settlement provides for the entry of consent decrees in which the tobacco companies agree to significant restrictions on advertising,,albeit more
modest ones than those set forth in the Global Settlement. Thus, under the
AG Settlement the consent decrees move from a role of "backstopping"
legislated regulations on advertising to a role of serving as the primary
mechanism for controlling advertising. Moreover, the AG Settlement, like
the Global Settlement, includes a "waiver of rights" provision as insurance
against judicial invalidation of these advertising restrictions. 9 Therefore
the AG Settlement, in a fashion even more dramatic than the Global Settlement, presupposes that commercial speech rights may be waived by negotiated contracts.
In sum, recent events have suggested that commercial advertising of
tobacco products conceivably could be governed by three of the four major
transactional rules: a police power rule, a property rule, or, if the FDA's
regulations are declared unconstitutional and the tobacco companies' waivers of rights are invalidated or ignored, an inalienability rule. The only
missing possibility is the liability rule. But it is no*t too hard to envision
how this too might eventually become a live option. First, suppose that the
courts rule that additional restrictions on tobacco advertising beyond those
contained in the AG Settlement are unconstitutional. Then, assume that it
proves impossible to secure a waiver of rights from the tobacco companies
with respect to these additional advertising restrictions, perhaps because the
federal government fails to secure such a waiver as part of a future settle20
ment of its recently proposed lawsuit against the tobacco companies.
17 See NAAG, Master Settlement Agreement (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http/www.naag.org/tob2.htn>
[hereinafter AG Settlement].
Is As of this writing, 44 of the 46 trial courts have approved the AG Settlement and associated consent
decrees. See NAAG, States with Approval (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.naag.org/consenthn>. Four
states (Mississippi, Florida, Minnesota, and Texas) had previously entered into individual settlements with the
tobacco companies and are not included in the AG Settlement
19 Specifically, the AG Settlement contains a provision in which each participating tobacco company:
acknowledges that it understands that certain provisions of this Agreement may require it to act or
refrain from acting in a manner that could otherwise give rise to state or federal constitutional
challenges and that, by voluntarily consenting to this Agreement, it ... waives for purposes of performance of this Agreement any and all claims that the provisions of this Agreement violate the

state or federal constitutions.
Supra note 17, art. XV.
20 In his State of the Union address on January 19, 1999, President Clinton announced that the federal government would file its own civil damages action against the major tobacco companies, seeking to
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Should these events come to pass, then Congress might be impelled to consider the possibility of condemning the commercial advertising rights of the
tobacco companies. The question would then be presented whether commercial speech rights-like property and contract rights-are the type of
constitutional right subject to forced exchange upon the payment of ex post
compensation. In other words, the liability rule solution.
This Article begins in Part I by considering the transaction structure of
constitutional rights from a theoretical perspective. The pioneering work of
Calabresi and Melamed serves as the central inspiration here, but it is given
a different explication than is commonly found in discussions of the transactional rules that apply in the private law context. Part II provides a summary of the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of commercial speech,
and of the advertising restrictions contained in the FDA regulations, the
Global Settlement, and the AG Settlement. Part 1I then applies the theory
developed in Part I to transaction structure issues likely to be presented by
these new cigarette advertising regimes. I conclude that efforts to restrict
cigarette advertising similar to those contained in the FDA regulations, the
Global Settlement, and the AG Settlement should be upheld by courts under
a police power rule. However, if the courts reject this conclusion, waivers
of commercial speech rights by the tobacco companies, such as the one
contained in the AG Settlement, should be enforced. Finally, if the courts
hold that tobacco advertising restrictions beyond those in the AG Settlement are unconstitutional, and if a waiver of rights cannot be secured with
respect to these additional restrictions, then I argue that condemnation of
the commercial speech rights of tobacco companies should be permitted.
I.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this Part, I offer a sketch of a theoretical framework for resolving
questions that arise concerning the transaction structure of constitutional
law. The framework is derived from the "view of the cathedral" presented
by Calabresi and Melamed in their famous article, which is usually applied
in discussing the transaction structure for common-law entitlements.2 But
I will give the C&M framework a somewhat different spin than is usually
encountered, in part because of differences between constitutional law and
recover tobacco-related costs incurred by the Medicare program and other federal programs besides Medicaid. Remarks as Preparedfor Delivery by President William Jefferson Clinton: State of the Union Address (last modified Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/l2R?um:pdi/oma.eop.gov.us/
1999/l/19/20.text.l>. It would appear to be the federal government's objective, following the lead of the
state attorneys general, to survive motions to dismiss such a suit, and then to try to enter into an additional
multibillion dollar settlement with the tobacco companies. Whether the federal government will in fact survive motions to dismiss, whether there will be an additional settlement, and whether the settlement would
include a new waiver of rights with respect to more draconian advertising restrictions, are all of course extremely conjectural possibilities at this point in time.
21 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3. For an overview of the literature spawned by
Calabresi and Melamed, see Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral,106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997).

1148

93:1143 (1999)

The Constitutionand the Cathedral

common law, and in part because of what I regard as shortcomings in the
conventional explication of this seminal work.
A. The Constitutions Cathedral
The conventional elaboration of the C&M framework in law-andeconomics literature starts by developing a two-by-two matrix describing
some kind of land-use dispute.22 On one axis, the initial entitlement is
given either to the plaintiffs (e.g., residents) or the defendants (e.g., polluters). On the other axis, the entitlement is protected either with a property
rule or a liability rule. As shown by Table 1,23 this generates four possibilities: the plaintiffs get the entitlement protected by an injunction ("Rule
One"); the plaintiffs get the entitlement protected by an award of damages
("Rule Two"); the defendants get an unrestricted entitlement to pollute
("Rule Three"); or the defendants get the entitlement but the plaintiff can
buy it out at a judicially-determined price ("Rule Four"):
METHOD OF PROTECTION

Injunction /
Property Rule
INITIAL
ENTITLEMENT

Residents

Polluters

Damages /
Liability Rule

Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 3

Rule 4

Table 1
Typically, this matrix is deployed in an analysis inspired by Coasean
transaction-cost economics. 24 The central question is how the initial assignment of entitlements and transactional rules will affect private bargaining among the parties. If transaction costs are low for both the plaintiffs
22 See e.g., Coleman & Kraus, supra note 3, at 1337; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973);
James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedralin Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 444 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The
Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
2 Adopted from Krier & Schwab, supranote 22, at 444.
24 See sources cited supranote 22. See also, eg., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as
Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
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and the defendants, all four options will presumably lead to efficient outcomes. Property rules (Rule One or Rule Three) may be favored here because they reduce judicial costs-there is no need to hold a hearing to set
damages--or because they protect non-market values (e.g., subjective valuations or "other justice reasons" 25 ). If transaction costs are asymmetrichigh for one side, low for the other-then the options become more constrained. Property rules may frustrate private bargaining because of holdout
or free-rider problems associated with the side having high transaction
costs. This may limit the court's choices if efficiency is desired. Finally, if
transaction costs are high for both sides, then choices are constrained even
further, because property rules can never be modified by private bargaining.
Thus, if the court is uncertain of the right result and wants to promote efficiency, it is assumed that recourse must be had to liability rules.
This conventional explication of the C&M framework has no doubt
generated valuable insights, but there are reasons to believe that it is not the
only fruitful interpretation. One evident shortcoming is that inalienability
rules are completely ignored in the conventional account. Inalienability is
treated as a fringe concept relevant only to phenomena like slavery contracts, sales of body parts, and other marginal issues where we have reason
to doubt the rationality of the participants or where nonmarket "moralisms"
dominate the usual concern with efficiency. 26 It is curious that the concept
of inalienability, which plays a central part in the original C&M article, is
implicitly dismissed in the conventional account as being of little intrinsic
interest to a theory of transaction structures.
A second shortcoming-in my view at least-is that the conventional
explication leads to a rather obsessive concern with the possible utility of
C&M's "discovery" of Rule Four. Rule Four is in effect a private right of
eminent domain: the plaintiff is empowered to take the entitlement without
the defendant's consent, but must provide just compensation to the defendant for doing so. Rule Four was serendipitously invoked by one court
about the same time the C&M article was published.27 Yet, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of tort and property teachers to promote Rule Four
as an option of equal dignity with Rules One to Three, it has rarely been
seen before or since.2 8 The usual combination of factors said to justify the
25 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1102-05. "Other justice reasons" can refer to consid-

erations such as who established their land use first-the "coming to the nuisance" problem.
26 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 24, at 715 n.l. This is not to say that the phenomenon
of inalienability has been ignored by legal scholars. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV.
1849 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 931 (1985). But the phenomenon has been treated more as a challenge to the economic perspective associated with the C&M framework, rather than an integral part of it.
27 See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
28 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997).
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application of Rule Four is that efficiency favors the plaintiffs, "other justice reasons" favor the defendant, and yet because the plaintiffs are numerous or otherwise face high transaction costs, there can be no assurance that
Rule Three (requiring the more effiqient plaintiffs to buy out the more deserving defendant) will work. The basic problem with this Rule Four scenario, however, is that if the plaintiffs face high transaction costs, they will
have no more success assembling a fund to pay just compensation to the defendant than they would have in putting together a negotiated buyout of the
defendant. 29 Given its lack of relevance to the real world of positive transaction costs, Rule Four probably does not deserve the prominence it receives in the standard account.
This specific critique of Rule Four reflects a more general problem
with the conventional explication, namely, that it implicitly adopts an overly
narrow conception of transaction costs. In the conventional account, transaction costs are often implicitly assumed to mean the costs of market exchange. But litigation is also costly. If we define transaction costs more
broadly to include all costs of organizing for effective collective action,
then it is clear that filing a lawsuit to obtain a judgment from a court establishing entitlements and transaction rules may also fail in the face of high
transaction costs. 30 Thus, liability rules-Rules Two and Four-do not represent the cure-all for high transaction costs occasionally suggested in the
literature. Just as low transaction costs on both sides can render all four
rules largely irrelevant-efficient outcomes will prevail no matter what initial allocation of entitlement and transaction rule we select-so high transaction costs on both sides can render all four rules largely irrelevant-the
entitlement will stay where it is initially allocated no matter what transaction rule we select.
For these and other reasons, I will depart from the conventional explication and instead offer a different view of the C&M cathedral. My interpretation is based not on a two-by-two matrix but rather on four possible
outcomes, ranked hierarchically in terms of the degree of difficulty they
pose for transfers away from the initial allocation of entitlements (see Table
2). Thus, at the top of the hierarchy we find an entitlement protected by an
inalienabilityrule, that is, the situation where no transfers of the entitlement
are permitted. This is followed by an entitlement protected by a property
rule, meaning that the entitlement may be transferred only with the consent
of the entitlement holder, presumably in return for consideration that the
entitlement holder values more than the entitlement. This is followed by an
entitlement protected by a liability rule, meaning that the entitlement can be
taken' without the entitlement holder's consent, but only upon payment of
just compensation. And bringing up the rear we find an entitlement that can
29 See Krier & Schwab, supranote 22.
30 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Krier & Schwab, supra note 22.
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be trumped by the police power, meaning that the entitlement can be taken
without the entitlement holder's consent and without the payment of just
compensation.

FOUR FOUR

INALIENABILITY RULE >

Property Rule >

TRANSACTIONAL

RULES

Liability Rule >
Police Power

Table 2
There are several advantages to this explication of the C&M framework in the context of considering different protections of constitutional
rights. First, it places the emphasis on the transactional rule rather than on
the assignment of entitlements. In the common law context, it may be plausible (at least to some) to assume that courts have freewheeling authority to
allocate entitlements to plaintiffs or defendants according to some ad hoc
economic analysis. But this assumption makes no sense in considering
constitutional entitlements, where the authoritative constitutional text itself
establishes the menu of entitlements and who gets them-generally private
persons who are subject to government regulatory power. The only significant issue in constitutional law, in the language of the C&M framework, is
the determination of which transactional rule should apply to these entitlements in any particular context. Thus, an analysis that downplays the question of who gets the entitlement makes more sense here.
Second, unlike the conventional explication, my treatment incorporates
the missing inalienability rules directly into the analysis. This addition is
important for an analysis of constitutional rights, where the unconstitutional
31
The unconditions doctrine plays such a large and often puzzling role.
constitutional conditions doctrine demarcates a sphere where inalienability
rules reign, and this sphere undoubtedly covers a larger area of constitutional law than inalienability rules occupy in the common law.
Third, my explication includes the three outcomes that are found most
commonly in common law litigation. Rule One in the conventional treatment corresponds to my "property rule," Rule Two to my "liability rule,"
31 For general commentary on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see, for example,
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Larry Alexander, Understanding Consti-

tutionalRights in a World of OptionalBaselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989); Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A SeparabilityApproach, 43 UCLA L. REV.
371 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
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and Rule Three to my "police power rule." What drops out in my version is
Rule Four. As previously suggested, this would not be much of a loss in the
explication of common law rules because this rule turns out to be of little
practical relevance in that context. But it is even more of an unnecessary
appendage in the constitutional realm. Rule Four in the constitutional con-.
text would imply a situation in which an individual can acquire a constitutional right against the government, but only by paying the government for
the costs associated with its exercise. Although it may be possible to
imagine such rules,32 if any actually exist they are rare.
Finally, and most importantly, I rely less heavily on transaction cost
considerations in developing the relevant considerations in choosing among
these outcomes. Transaction costs will enter the picture, but in a more secondary fashion than is typical under the conventional analysis. Instead, I
will deploy my hierarchy of outcomes in light of an older economic tradition-that associated with the concept of externalities. Only after this basic
assessment is undertaken will I turn to transaction cost economics. In this
sense, I will give the C&M framework a more "Pigouvian" spin than is
customarily33 found in the conventional explication, which is purely
"Coasean."
B. The ExternalBenefits and Costs of ConstitutionalRights
My proposed explication of the transaction structure of constitutional
rights is based on the external benefits and external costs associated with
the exercise of different constitutional rights. 34 Presumably, most constitutional rights provide private benefits to the rightsholder, whether it be the
self-expression guarded by the First Amendment, the privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment, or the freedom from egregious punishments barred
by the Eighth Amendment. In additidn, however, the exercise of constitutional rights in many circumstances generates external benefits and external
costs for third parties.
32 One possibility is suggested by cases involving access to traditional public forums to engage in
speech-protected activities. A rule that permitted groups to obtain access to the public streets to conduct
a demonstration, but only on condition that they agree to pay the costs of policing and litter removal,
might qualify as an illustration of a Rule Four constitutional entitlement. Whether such a rule would be
permissible under current law is uncertain. See Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123 (1992) (invalidating discretionary advance fee of $100 for demonstration justified in part by
anticipated costs of police protection).

33 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,39-44 (1960) (contrasting
"Pig-

ouvian tradition" based on government action to internalize external costs and benefits with Coase's approach based on a comparison of government action and market exchange). As to whether the
distinction between these traditions is in fact as sharp as Coase suggests, see R.H. Coase, Law and Economics andA.W. Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1996); A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou
Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996).

34 The following discussion builds upon Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72 DEN. U. L. REv. 859 (1995).
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It is easy to think of examples of constitutional rights that generate external benefits. Free speech rights are probably the most commonly recognized illustration. 5 Information is a public good which can be consumed
by an unlimited number of persons. Thus, protecting A's right to disseminate information to B will often generate benefits in the form of additional
information for C, D, E, F, etc. as well. Separation of powers provisions offer another example. Individual defendants typically invoke separation of
powers defenses (e.g., that the suit cannot be heard by an Article I court)
not because these rights necessarily have any intrinsic value to the litigant,
but primarily for strategic reasons. Nevertheless, the general public benefits
by the enforcement of these principles because this preserves our system of
checks and balances among the branches.
It is also not hard to think of examples of constitutional rights that generate external costs. The Fourth Amendment, to the extent it is protected by
the exclusionary rule, is one example. If the Fourth Amendment requires
the suppression of evidence that allows a career criminal to go free, then the
exercise of this constitutional right may result in external costs being imposed on third persons. Even rights that ordinarily generate external benefits can on occasion lead to large external costs. If the First Amendment is
36
applied so as to permit self-styled Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, the
anguish imposed on local residents who remember death camps run by real
Nazis is an external cost of this exercise of First Amendment rights.
My basic theory is that the transactional rule applied to any particular
constitutional right will depend primarily on whether the exercise of that
right generates significant net external benefits or significant net external
costs. Constitutional rights that generate significant net external benefits
above and beyond the value of the private right will be protected with inalienability rules, because the individual valuation of the right will fail to take
into account the external benefits generated by the exercise of the right.
Thus, permitting individuals to waive these rights in exchange for quid pro
quos they value more highly would deprive society of valuable external
benefits associated with the rights' exercise. An example would be applicants for government employment asked to waive their rights to publish
books in return for a government job. 37 The job applicants would weigh the
offer against their private assessment of the likely benefits they will gain
from future book publication. But this ignores the external benefits to the
public from increased information-a classic public good. Consequently,
there is reason to believe that permitting individual waivers by job applicants, particularly on a mass scale, would lead to inefficient outcomes.
35 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I (1986).

36 See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
37 See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
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At the other extreme, where the exercise of constitutional rights generates net external costs that exceed the private value of the right, those rights
are subject to being trumped by the police power. This is because the individual valuation of the right is more than offset by the external costs generated by the exercise of the right, making enforcement of the right socially
inefficient. 38 An example would be a police request to enter a home in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. The homeowner is likely to weigh the costs and
benefits of waiving Fourth Amendment rights and consenting to police entry solely in terms of his or her valuation of the intrusion of the search, and
may not factor in the external costs to third parties if the felon is allowed to
escape. To protect society's interest in preventing the imposition of large
external costs in these situations, we allow the government's police power
to trump the Fourth Amendment right by carving out' 39of the warrant re,
quirement an exception for arrests made in "hot pursuit.
The intermediate case between these two poles is where a constitutional right has no significant net external benefits or costs, either because
there are no appreciable external effects or because the external benefits and
external costs more or less cancel each other out. In these situations, we
typically allow the individual rightsholder to determine whether to invoke
the right or to waive the right in exchange for government benefits that have
a higher value.
Plea bargaining is an example where the exercise of a constitutional
right has both positive and negative external effects and where waivers are
routinely enforced. The right in question is the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public criminal trial. Exercise of this right surely gives rise to
external benefits, such as greater public information about law enforcement
and criminal behavior, opportunities for civic participation in government,
and so forth.40 But exercise of the right also generates external costs, given
that the expense of public trials is heavily subsidized by the state and thus
borne by taxpayers. If every accused criminal received a full-blown trial,
we would have to expand the judicial system many times over. Different
commentators have placed different values on the marginal benefits of additional trials versus the marginal costs of additional trials.4 ' But it is not
implausible that on balance the external benefits and costs here are a tossup, or at least that the relative valuation of the external benefits and costs is
indeterminate, making a property rule the correct choice.
38 This analysis assumes, ofcourse, that all external benefits and costs are capable of valuation under

a common metric, such as dollars. Many will question this assumption, especially where the external benefits or costs are long-term and systemic or structural in nature. Nevertheless, I will not explore these problems here, for fear of digressing too far from explication of the basic theoretical framework.
39 See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
40 Cf.Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (criticizing settlement of litigation on the ground that it vitiates the "public values" associated with public trials).
41 Compare Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909 (1992), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, PleaBargainingas Disaster,101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
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In short, the key variable in choosing among these three transactional
options-inalienability rules, property rules, and police power rules-is the
"public goods value" of the exercise of a constitutional right in a given circumstance, or PGVcr for short. This public goods value is simply the net
value of the external benefits of the exercise of the right (EB,), and the external costs of the exercise of the right (ECcr). Thus,
PGVcr = EBr - ECcr.
What this says is that every invocation of a constitutional right will have a
certain public goods component, and that this component is made up of any
external benefits associated with the exercise of that right minus any external costs associated with the exercise of that right.
In addition to its public goods value, constitutional rights have (in most
cases) a private value to the rightsholder (PVr). Putting together the PVc,
and the PGVcr we obtain the following conditions for applying inalienability
rules (IR), property rules (PR), and police power rules (PPR):
(1) IR,

PGVcr + PVcr > PVcr or
PGVrr > 0

(2) PR, PGVcr + PV, = PVr or
PGV
(3)

= 0

PPR, PGV + PVcr < 0 or
PGVcr < -PVcr

Equation One tells us that inalienability rules should apply when the public
goods value of the exercise of a right is positive (because EBcr > ECcr) and
consequently the total value of the exercise of the right (PGVr + PVcr) is
greater than the private value alone. In these circumstances, the individual
valuation of the right diverges from the social valuation of the right, giving
rise to a danger that the individual will waive the right even though it is socially inefficient to do so. The solution is to bar waivers of such rights, that
is, to make them inalienable. We can do this either by prohibiting contracts
to sell the right (e.g., slavery contracts or contracts to sell votes) or, more
commonly, by allowing the entitlement holder to keep both the right and the
consideration that the government previously paid in attempting to induce
waiver of the right (e.g., the government employee gets to keep her First
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Amendment rights and the government job that was supposedly conditioned
on her waiver of these rights).
Equation Two tells us that property rules should apply when the public
goods value of the exercise of the right is zero, a result that occurs when
EBcr and EC, are both zero or when EBcr = ECr. In these circumstances,
the total value of the right exactly equals the private value, and there is no
significant divergence between the individual valuation of the right and the
social valuation of the right. Permitting the entitlement holder to waive her
rights in these circumstances is thus consistent with social efficiency, subject to the usual caveats about the absence of fraud, duress, and so forth.
Equation Three tells us that the police power rule should apply when
the public goods value of the exercise of the right is negative (because EBcr
< ECcr) and this negative social value more than wipes out the presumed
positive private value of the right to the entitlement holder. In these circumstances, the total value of the exercise of the right is negative, and social welfare is improved if the right is trumped by the exercise of the police
power. This is consistent with the traditional understanding that the police
power concept entails, first, an assessment of the government interest in
regulation (aimed at eliminating or avoiding a negative PGVr associated
with the exercise of the right) and, second, a finding that the government
interest outweighs the private interest.
C. The Role of Liability Rules
So far, my Pigouvian explication of the C&M framework based on
external costs and benefits has considered only three types of rules-inalienability rules, property rules, and police power rules. What is the rationale for adding a fourth type-liability rules? Liability rules pose a degree
of difficulty for transfers away from the initial allocation of entitlements
that is intermediate between property rules and police power rules. They
are less restrictive of transfers than property rules, because they do not require that the government obtain the consent of the entitlement holder before a transfer may take place. On the other hand, they are more
constraining than police power rules, because under a liability rule the government is required to compensate for the loss of the entitlement, whereas
under a police power rule the government overrides the entitlement without
any need to pay compensation.
The case for liability rules in the constitutional context is somewhat
complex, and entails three subsidiary questions. First, why do we need
compelled transfers as opposed to voluntary waivers of rights? This question demands a justification for reducing the barriers to transfer below those
associated with property rules. Second, why do we provide compensation
as opposed to simply declaring that the government interest trumps the private right? This question demands a justification for the practice of providing compensation in the case of some compelled transfers but not those
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associated with exercises of the police power. Third, does the compensation requirement impose other limitations on the domain of liability rules?
Here, we have to face the difficulty that not all constitutional rights are
equally amenable to being valued in monetary terms.
1. Why Compelled Transfers? The basic explanation for shifting from
property rules to liability rules is one that will be highly familiar to those
conversant with the C&M literature-high transaction costs. 42 The analysis
here reverts to the standard C&M explication reflected in Table 1. In other
words, we start with the standard hypothetical world of residents and polluters-or here, rightsholders and the government-with the usual assumptions of low transaction costs, no external effects beyond the parties to the
dispute, full information, and rationality. In such a situation, constitutional
rights should be protected by property rules. If the individual values the
right more than the government values its abrogation, the individual will refuse the government's entreaty to waive her rights. If the individual values
the right less than the government values its abrogation, the individual will
waive her rights in return for some payment offered by the government
having greater value to her. Either way, the result is socially efficient.
In many constitutional contexts, this stylized set of circumstances may
be a fair approximation of reality. Witf respect to plea bargaining, for example, it is plausible to regard the negotiations over the waiver of the right
as taking place in a relatively low transaction cost setting. There are only
two parties to the negotiations-the government and the accused. Each side
42

In the discussion so far, I have implicitly assumed away all concern with transaction costs.

With respect to rights that generate significant net external benefits or net external costs, I have assumed
that private bargaining cannot supply the external benefits or avoid the external costs because of high
transaction costs. If we were talking about external benefits and costs associated with private property
and contract rights, this would be a questionable assumption, and some discussion of the various mechanisms that the common law has devised for generating small scale public goods and overcoming small
scale public bads would be in order. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1322-35 (1993) (discussing ways in which parcelization of land contributes to finding contractual solutions to "small events" and "medium events"). Where the external benefits and external costs of the exercise of constitutional rights are concerned, however, it is reasonable to assume that bargaining is not
going to be the solution. If the exercise of a right generates external benefits-as for example with the
exercise of free speech rights in many contexts-those benefits are likely to be spread very widely
among a disparate group of persons, including members of future generations, who cannot realistically
bargain to preserve those benefits. Similarly, if the exercise of the right generates external costs-as
where the Fourth Amendment is used to free persons who otherwise would be convicted of crimes-the
external costs may be disbursed very widely, also making negotiations among affected parties an unrealistic option for eliminating these costs. I have also implicitly assumed that where there are no significant external benefits or external costs, that is, where PGV. is roughly zero, either because EB., and
ECc are both zero, or because EB,, = EC,,, that private bargaining will always function smoothly to handle transfers of constitutional rights. This is also a simplifying assumption that will not be borne out in
every case. I do not deal with this complication here, other than to note that the liability rule solution
can handle bargaining breakdowns from any source, whether it be transactions costs generated by large
numbers of affected parties, or simple bilateral monopoly.
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is represented by counsel and hence is presumably informed of the relevant
options and their consequences. There may be some room for strategic behavior, but each side has a viable alternative to reaching a deal-each can
insist on going forward with the public trial.43 No doubt there are in some
cases problems of duress, incompetence, and conflict of interest. But it
would seem that these problems can be handled by application of ordinary
contract law principles. 4 Thus, there is no obvious reason to depart from
property rules in this situation and permit the government to condemn an
accused's right to a public trial in return for ex post compensation, or, for
"Rule Four" aficionados, to permit the accused to buy his way out of a public trial upon payment to the government.
In other situations, however, negotiations over the transfer of a right
may break down or be too costly. The primary cause of high transaction
costs in the exchange of constitutional rights is probably the presence of
monopoly power on the entitlement holder's side. If the government can
accomplish its objectives by dealing in a competitive market of rightsholders, then it is unlikely that transaction costs will stand in the way of exchange. However, if the rightsholder has a degree of monopoly power over
the right that the government wants to acquire, then the holdout potential
becomes acute, and with it the danger of spiraling transaction costs.
The classic illustration of this phenomenon comes from the law of eminent domain. If the government's desire for land is not site-dependent-for
example, if it wants to acquire land to build a new prison in a rural areathen there is no need to shift from property rules to liability rules. The government has many options to choose from, and it can strike a mutually satisfactory deal with one or more sellers of vacant rural land. However, if the
government's needs are site-dependent-say, it wants to acquire hundreds
of contiguous parcels of land for a new highway-then it is likely that one
or more landowners will hold out or bargain strategically. This will substantially raise the transaction costs of acquiring the desired land. The
has been explained as a device for overcoming
power of eminent domain
45
costs.
transaction
these
Whether the government faces a thick market of rights-sellers or a monopolist will often depend on how the government defines its objectives.
Suppose that as part of a "beautification" program, a city concludes that
there are too many push-cart vendors on downtown sidewalks.4 6 Suppose
further that the push-cart vendors have licenses from the city that are re43 See Gannett Co.

v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382-83 n.1 1 (1979) (either defendant or prosecution can demand a public trial); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35-37 (1965) (either defendant
or prosecution can demand a jury trial).
44 See Scott & Stuntz, supranote 5.
45 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-61 (4th ed. 1992) (discussion of
eminent domain); Merrill, supra note 6.
46 Cf City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (equal protection challenge to program
to eliminate most of push-cart vendors from French Quarter of city).
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garded as obligations protected under the Contract Clause. If the city wants
to reduce the number of push-cart vendors by half, there is probably no reason why it cannot simply buy out the licenses of half of the existing vendors. If one vendor is stubborn and refuses to deal, the city can just go to
the next one until it reaches its quota. However, if the city decides that it
wants to eliminate all licensed push-cart vendors, every rightsholder becomes a potential monopolist holding the last license. Thus, just one stubborn hold-out could foil the plan, and the government needs the trump card
of forced exchange. This explains why contractual obligations, like prop47
erty rights, are subject to the power of eminent domain.
2. Why Compensation? If high transaction costs are the explanation
for shifting from property rules to liability rules, then what is the explanation for not shifting further and simply replacing property rules with police
power rules? If the rightsholder has a monopoly on a right that the government wants to acquire and this causes the transaction costs of exchange
to rise precipitously, those transaction costs can be seen as a type of "externality" associated with the exercise of the right. The framework adopted in
this Article suggests that where the exercise of constitutional rights generates external costs in excess of the private value of the right, the principal
solution is simply to shift to a police power rule.
The shift from a property rule to a police power rule has in fact happened fairly frequently throughout our history, as the history of the Contract
Clause reveals. 4 In Stone v. Mississippi,49 for example, the state legislature
granted a twenty-five-year charter to a company to conduct a lottery. Two
years later, the state rescinded the charter and prohibited further operation
of the lottery. Although prior precedent indicated that such charters create
0
contractual obligations protected under the Contract Clause, the Supreme
Court upheld the state's elimination of the lottery without compensation as
a proper exercise of its police power. As the Court put it, "Any one...
who accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding that
the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted agencies, may resume [the charter] at any time when the public good
51
In so ruling, the Court emshall require, whether it be paid for or not.
52
phasized the "inherent vices" and "demoralizing ... effects" of lotteries.
47See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,19 n.16 (1977); Contributors to Pa.
Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507
(1848).
48 See generally BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 203-

13 (1938) (tracing development of the "reserved powers" doctrine).
49 101 U.S. 814 (1880).

50See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (corporate
charter is contract protected by the Contract Clause).
51Stone, 101 U.S. at 821.
52 Id. at 818.
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That is to say, the Court endorsed this use of the police power because of
the perceived external costs it associated with lotteries. 53
In other circumstances, however, the police power solution to the
problem of monopoly and high transaction costs has been rejected, and the
courts have required that the government pay just compensation for a coerced transfer of property or contract rights. The reason why compensation
is required in some cases but not in others leads us into the regulatory takings puzzle-when does an exercise of the police power go "too far" and
hence require compensation? 54 Without purporting to offer a complete answer to that puzzle, we can say for present purposes that compensation is
typically required when the entitlement holder is perceived as being blameless for the externalities that the government is trying to either eliminate or
produce through a coerced exchange of property rights.55 Thus, the owner
of land impressed into service for a new highway or courthouse is entitled
to compensation because the owner is not perceived as being the cause of
any externality that the project is designed to eliminate or produce. In contrast, an owner of a printing press used to make counterfeit bills or a chemical lab used to make illegal drugs is not entitled to compensation when the
government seizes these assets,5 because in these cases the owner is identi-

53 See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (upholding state law prohibiting the use
of property for manufacturing alcoholic beverages on the ground "that the idleness, disorder, pauperism,
and crime existing in this country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this evil").
5 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See, eg., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "Just Compensation " Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
55 This is captured in the often-quoted statement that the purpose of the compensation requirement
is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be bome by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Generally speaking, two conditions must be established to make out a claim for compensation under the
Takings Clause. First, the government must be coercing an exchange of property rights, not merely
limiting the class of permissible uses of property. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (compensation required for regulation that is "the equivalent of a physical appropriation"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (compensation required when the government "chops through" the owner's bundle of rights, "taking a slice of
every strand"). Second, the purpose of the coerced exchange must be for a purpose other than stopping
an activity that is regarded as imposing harm on others. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)
(civil forfeiture of automobile used in assignation with prostitute did not constitute a compensable taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 n.22 (1987) ("a State need
not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public nuisance"); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding statute requiring
destruction of cedar trees infected with cedar rust without compensation in order to preserve apple orchards having a higher social value). See generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search
of Underlying Principles,Part I-Takings as IntentionalDeprivationsof Property Without Moral Jus78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990).
tification,
56
SeeBennis, 516 U.S. at 442.
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fled as the source of the negative externalities that the government is seeking to overcome.
One clear case for compensation rather than police power rules is
where PGVcr is negative and more than wipes out PVcr, but prior precedent
compels the conclusion that the regulated party has a constitutionally protected right. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,17 for example, the
Court held that, under longstanding precedent, holders of government bonds
secured by specific revenues have an entitlement protected by the Contract
Clause that renders a proposed governmental diversion of the revenues to
other worthy purposes unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged that the
diversion of revenues might produce public benefits greater than the loss in
value suffered by the bondholders. 8 But it declined to "engage in a utilitarian comparison of public benefit and private loss"5 9 and suggested that if
the government wanted to repeal the pledge, it would have to pay the bondholders just compensation.60 Similarly, your standard eminent domain case
can be seen as a situation where a coerced transfer of property would produce public benefits that exceed the private value of the right, but there is
no doubt under established law that the property owner's interest is constitutionally protected. It may be that we always require compensation in
these cases in order to preserve the "bright-line" rule that real estate is a
form of constitutionally protected property.
The "hard cases" that fall in between the drug lab case and the standard
eminent domain case often involve situations in which public perceptions of
what kinds of uses of property are blameworthy are undergoing change.
Consider in this regard the disquiet over the government power to declare
private land a critical habitat for endangered species of plants and animals. 6'
A government order banning development of private land in order to protect
an endangered species may make sense from the perspective of external
benefits and costs. If development goes forward, some species of immense
potential value may be lost, and thousands of persons around the world
concerned with preservation of biodiversity will experience a measure of
unhappiness. Thus, the external costs of development, once the discounted
probability of losing valuable species and the aggregated unhappiness to the
very large and diffuse group of biodiversity advocates are factored in, may
well exceed the loss in value to the landowner.
Nevertheless, many observers think it is unduly arbitrary to impose the
costs of preservation entirely on the shoulders of a single landowner, who
may have had no knowledge of the existence of the species when the property was purchased, and who is not proposing to do anything with the prop57 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
58 See id. at 29.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 19.
61 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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erty that other landowners are not permitted to do. Given the widespread
perception that the landowner is "innocent" of any antisocial behavior, 2 the
use of a liability rule-forced exchange with compensation-may appear
more appropriate here than the shift all the way to a police power rule.
As the lottery and the endangered species examples suggest, public
perceptions about what sort of conduct is blameworthy can shift over time,
sometimes quite rapidly. It may be, therefore, that liability rules function in
part as transitional relief that applies to individuals during changeover from
a situation where an entitlement is protected by a property rule, or conceivably even a rule of inalienability, to a police power rule. Today, many
people regard property owners who resist the imposition of preservation orders designed to protect endangered species with sympathy. Tomorrow,
they may be regarded as lottery promoters were in the late nineteenth century, thus making a police power rule seem more appropriate.
3. Objective Measures of Compensation. Even if high transaction
costs cause us to abandon property rules, and sympathy for the rightsholder
or prior determinations of constitutional protection cause us to resist moving all the way to a police power rule, there is a third constraint that limits
the domain of liability rules: the need for an objective basis for calculating
expost compensation. One reason why liability rules work in the context of
property and contract rights is that objective benchmarks are available to
value these rights when taken by the government. Property rights usually
have a market value. As the Supreme Court has made clear, this market
value-what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property in
question-serves as the presumptive measure of just compensation for takings of property. 64 Similarly, commercial contract rights usually have an
objectively determinable value, established, again, with reference to the difference between the contract price and the market value of that which is the
subject of the contract. 65 This established basis for valuing contract rights
again serves as the measure for computing ex post damages for takings of
contractual rights.
The importance of having some objectively determinable measure of
compensation can be seen by considering the problems that would emerge
in the absence of such a measure. For these purposes, it may be useful to
reflect on why we do not use liability rules to protect Fourth Amendment
62 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305,345 (1997).
63 See Thomas W. Merrill, Towarda GeneralTheory of Minority Groups: Outsider Groups Adversity Groups, and Transfer Groups, 3 ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 69 (1995) (comparing compensation
for takings to compensation for victims of natural disasters and other transient adversities).
64 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 n.l (1984); Kirby Forest Indus.
Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
65 See generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.9 (1990).
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rights. In many respects, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches would seem to be a good candidate for the use of liability
rules. Indeed, one of the nation's leading commentators on the Amendment, Akhil Amar, has argued that ex post damages is both the original understanding of how the Fourth Amendment should be enforced and the
preferred measure of protection today.66
In terms of the framework deployed here, the current regime of protection afforded to Fourth Amendment rights can be described as a foundational property rule subject to numerous exceptions where we follow what
amounts to a police power rule. The foundational rule is a property rule because rightsholders are permitted to consent to government searches, that is,
to waive their right.67 This property rule is enforced via the mechanism of
the exclusionary rule, which can be viewed as a penalty-default rule68 imposed on the government for engaging in unconsented searches. However,
because of the high external costs associated with the exclusionary rule,
namely, that guilty criminals may go free, the Fourth Amendment is laced
with numerous exceptions in which a police power rule applies. The most
important of these, at least in doctrinal terms, is the warrant requirement: a
search may proceed without consent if the police obtain a warrant in an ex
parte hearing before a magistrate in which they show probable cause that
the search will yield evidence of a crime, contraband, or a fugitive.
Liability rules would seem to make more sense than this patchwork of
property rules and police power exceptions. The argument for liability
rules in the Fourth Amendment context would begin by noting that the government will often face high transaction costs in negotiating consents to
searches. The problem is essentially one of adverse selection. Innocent
owners might agree readily enough to waive their rights and consent to
government searches of their property; but owners harboring inculpatory
evidence, contraband, or fugitives, would not. In effect, the owners of the
properties the government is most anxious to search would have monopoly
power that would raise transaction cost barriers to negotiation. On the other
hand, shifting to a police power rule across the board would effectively negate the constitutional right. Specifically, it would deprive innocent owners
subjected to unreasonable searches of any remedy for these intrusions on
their privacy. A liability rule appears to strike the right compromise: the
government would be able to conduct reasonable searches without fear of
monopoly holdouts by the guilty, while the requirement of ex post compensation for unreasonable searches would protect the innocent.
66 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES
1-45 (1997).
67 See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure,75 VA. L. REv. 761, 786-795
(1989).

68 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory

of DefaultRules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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The liability rule proposal, however, would pose a serious problem in
terms of determining the amount of compensation that should be paid ex
post for unreasonable government searches. There is no established market
price or other financial benchmark for unreasonable government searches.
Thus, advocates like Amar are forced to say that the matter should be left to
the discretion of the jury.69 The difficulty with this solution is that another
adverse selection problem would emerge under a regime of ex post actions
for damages. Given jury discretion and the elasticity of the concept of an
"unreasonable" search, it is likely that only innocent owners would sue.
For the same reasons, it is likely that they would usually win. Armed with
the wisdom of hindsight that the search turned up nothing, juries would be
strongly inclined to award some measure of damages as compensation for
the inconvenience and embarrassment of the intrusion. But with no available benchmark for establishing the size of the award, the magnitude of
verdicts would vary tremendously. The insurance costs of all governmental
entities with police forces would rise, perhaps dramatically.
The objection that ex post compensation would increase the costs of
government, and hence would require increases in taxes, is not necessarily a
fatal one. But at least it helps explain why the Supreme Court has instinctively shied away from the liability rule solution in this context. With respect to takings of property and contract rights, jury awards of compensation
are constrained by the existence of well-established formulas, grounded in
market values, for computing compensation. Using liability rules to remedy Fourth Amendment violations, in contrast, would operate more like an
open-ended regime of punitive damages. 70 Governmental entities at all levels would howl with indignation if subjected to such uncertain liabilities.
Knowing this, the Court has stuck to the messy patchwork of a foundational
property rule subject to a myriad of exceptions. If there is a way to escape
this doctrinal mess and enter the simpler world of liability rules, it would
almost certainly require a legislated solution, including a fixed schedule of
administrative penalties for defined categories of improper searches.
D. The Generalityof Analysis
A final point that has been touched upon but deserves more explicit
comment concerns the generality with which we apply the transaction
structure analysis. Constitutional law in general consists of a mix of "categorical rules" and "balancing tests,",7' analogous to the use of per se rules
69 See AMAR, supra note 66, at 44-45.
70 For a discussion of the problems associated with juries imposing ex post punitive damages under uncertain standards see W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmentaland Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 322-332 (1998).
71 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L.REV. 1482 (1975); Kathleen M. Sullivan, PostLiberal Judging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293 (1992). For a
helpful reminder that rules (categories) and standards (balancing) are just two polar variations on nu-
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and the rule of reason in antitrust law or to rules and standards more generally.72 Categorical rules are said to apply when the Court is confident of the
result that should obtain in virtually all cases. Case-by-case balancing tests
are used when the Court intuits that a more intensive examination of the
facts should be undertaken in each case before deciding on the result.
There is no reason why analysis of the transaction structure should not
proceed the same way. Indeed, as noted in the introduction, there are several areas of the law where repeated exposure to the issue has resulted in
relatively categorical rules. 73 Waivers of the right to engage in future political speech are almost never enforced; plea bargaining agreements are always enforced absent some defect in the bargaining process; government
regulation of nuisances never gives rise to a right of compensation. In
terms of the framework developed here, these rules reflect a judgment that
in the general run of the cases falling within each of these categories, the
PGVcr of the exercise of the right is either large and positive, approximately
zero, or large and negative. This does not mean that there will not be exceptional cases in each category. But the judicial judgment has been that
the administrative costs and error costs of permitting courts to ferret out the
exceptions do not justify the gains from fine-tuning.
Where constitutional law has not fixed on categorical rules, the Court
often prescribes some kind of formulaic multiprong "test" to structure the
inquiry. 74 Examples are the three-part formula for assessing restrictions on
symbolic speech, 75 the four-part formula for considering regulations of
commercial speech,76 the three-part cost-benefit test for determining the
procedures required by due process, 77 and the three-part formula for evaluating regulatory takings claims.78 Although presented by the Court as imposing a law-like constraint, in practice these formulas permit a good deal
of variation in outcomes, depending on how courts assess the facts relevant
to each "prong" of the formula.79 Predictability is rarely achieved through
subsequent refinements in the language used to describe the formulas. Inmerous intermediate constitutional themes, see James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on
the Bright Line-BalancingTest Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
72

See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF

RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The

Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995).
73 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
74 See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985) (critically discussing the proliferation of multiprong constitutional tests).
75 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980).
77 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
79 Cf Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87
(1989) (judges applying totality-of-the-circumstances tests "are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law").
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stead, it is the accumulation of precedent that provides points of reference
from which lower courts and litigants can reason by analogy.
Similarly, the framework offered above would presumably be applied
in a case-by-case fashion in situations where the correct transactional rule
was a matter of doubt. Moreover, my manner of expressing the relevant
variables would not offer any escape from the frustrating unpredictability
associated with the multipart tests used by the Court in determining the
scope of substantive constitutional rights. Asking courts to consider the
"external benefits" and "external costs" of constitutional rights-not to
mention the "transaction costs" of acquisition of the right and other variables-would not eliminate the potential for significant disagreements over
the facts of each case. The primary justification for considering the transaction structure in terms of the proposed economic framework thus is not
that it would substitute objectivity and certainty for mush. Instead, the justification lies in the unifying perspective that this vocabulary brings to a
wide range of constitutional issues, and in its identification of common
variables that might otherwise be overlooked under alternative approaches.
II. TOBACCO ADVERTISING: CURRENT LAW AND EMERGING ISSUES
Before applying the proposed transaction structure to tobacco advertising, it is useful to consider both current First Amendment doctrine as it
applies to commercial speech80 and the controls on advertising that are most
likely to be adopted in the future.81 The doctrine and regulation of tobacco
advertising are in a state of flux-and headed on a collision course.
A. The CurrentState of the CommercialSpeech Doctrine
As is well known, before the mid- 1970s restrictions on commercial advertising were regarded as regulations of commerce, not speech, and hence
were not thought to raise any issue under the First Amendment. 2 In transgo To simplify matters, I will not discuss federalism and separation of powers issues that might be
presented by tobacco advertising controls. The federalism issues include questions about the limits on
federal commandeering of states, which might be presented by federal legislation directing the states to
adopt advertising or marketing controls as proposed in the Global Settlement (compare with, e.g., Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)); issues of federal preemption of state advertising regulations (see
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)); and possible issues under the Commerce Clause
raised by state regulations that have extraterritorial effects (compare with Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). Separation of powers questions, may be presented by the use of consent decrees
in lieu of legislation to establish a comprehensive regime of tobacco advertising controls, as in the AG
Settlement. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policiesfrom PoliticalChange, 1987 U. ClI. LEGAL F. 295 (1987).
81 Readers who are already up to speed on the current state of the Supreme Court's commercial
speech doctrine may wish to skip Part II.A. Those familiar with the recent struggles over the FDA's
regulations and the tobacco settlements may wish to skip Part II.B.
82 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-Historyof CommercialSpeech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993); Martin H.
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action structure terms, the purveyors of advertising were subject to a universal police power rule. In the mid-1970s, however, the Court reconsidered this understanding and began subjecting advertising restrictions to a
kind of intermediate standard of scrutiny under the First Amendment.83
This approach eventually crystallized into one of those "multiprong" formulas of which the 84Burger Court was so fond, in this case the four-step
CentralHudson test:
In commercial speech cases ...

a four-part analysis has developed. At

the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. [1] For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2]

whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and
85 [4] whether it is not more
interest.
that
serve
to
necessary
is
than
extensive
The first prong of CentralHudson's four-part test creates what are in
effect two categorical police power rules within the universe of commercial
speech regulation: advertising for activities that are illegal and advertising
that is false or misleading continue to enjoy no First Amendment protection. These exceptions make sense, in that both advertising for illegal
products and false or misleading advertising would seem to generate significant external costs while conferring few or no offsetting benefits.
The remaining three prongs implicitly recognize that there are other
circumstances besides advertising for illegal transactions and false advertising in which the external costs associated with advertising may exceed its
benefits. These prongs can be read as a series of screens designed to identify such advertising. The external costs must be significant, that is, the
government interest being asserted must be "substantial." The regulation
must be effective in reducing those costs, that is, it must "directly advance"
this government interest. Finally, there must be no alternative non-speechrelated regulation that would achieve the reduction in costs as effectively,
that is, the regulation must not be "more extensive than necessary."
When it was first announced, the Central Hudson formula was regarded as a moderately conservative restatement of the Court's commercial
Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of FreeExpression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429,451-58 (1971).
83 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, FirstAmendment Protectionfor Commercial Advertising: The New ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. Ci. L. REV. 205
(1976).
84 See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980).
85 Id. The numbers were helpfully inserted by Justice White in United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418,424 (1993).
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speech doctrine.8 6 More recently, support for the CentralHudson approach
appears to be crumbling, among conservative as well as liberal Justices, in
favor of an even more speech-protective standard. If the current Court can
agree on little else, it is consistently well disposed toward free-speech interests. A newly reinforced block of traditional free-speech liberals, Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, has joined with a block of libertarian conservatives, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy,8 7 to produce
seven reasonably solid votes for pro-First Amendment outcomes. This
coalition is threatening to jettison CentralHudson in favor of an approach
that would adopt a special commercial speech standard only with respect to
advertising for illegal transactions and advertising that is false or deceptive. 8 All other advertising regulations would be subjected to the same
demanding standards that apply in assessing regulations of political speech.
Two recent cases reveal the shift in judicial attitudes and define the terrain over which regulations of tobacco advertising will be fought. United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 89 is the last case decided by the Court to
uphold a content-based regulation of truthful, nondeceptive advertising of a
commercial product or service. 90 At issue was the validity of a federal statute that prohibited broadcasters from carrying advertisements for state lotteries if the broadcaster's antenna was physically located in a state that did
not have such a lottery. The statute created anomalies for radio stations,
like Edge Broadcasting Company, that operated in a state where lotteries
were illegal (North Carolina) but near the border of a state which had a lottery (Virginia). Indeed, ninety percent of Edge's listeners lived in Virginia,
where lotteries were legal and vigorously promoted.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, applied the CentralHudson
test and upheld the statute. The federal interest was not described as controlling advertising for an illegal transaction. The advertising Edge wanted
to run was for the Virginia state lottery-a legal lottery-and residents of
86 See, ag., Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 34-35 (1980) (noting that although CentralHudson is "less solicitous" of commercial speech
than some other decisions, "[t]he most striking aspects of the case are the weight of the burden put upon
the state and the degree to which judicial opinion is substituted for state regulatory authority").
87 Cf. Frederick Schauer, The PoliticalIncidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 935 (1993) (noting apparent trend toward increasing affiliation between conservative political
groups and free speech principles).
88 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opin-

ion); id at 518 (Thomas J., concurring).
89 509 U.S. 418 (1993).

90 In Florida Bar v. Wentfor It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court, by a vote of five to four,
upheld a thirty day ban on direct solicitation of accident victims by personal injury lawyers. See id. at
619. In addition to being a type of time, place and manner restriction, this regulation obviously affected
only advertising by the legal profession. Restrictions on advertising by professionals have always been
treated somewhat more sympathetically by the Court than restrictions on purely commercial advertising
controls. See generally, Daniel Halberstam, CommercialSpeech, ProfessionalSpeech, and the ConstitutionalStatus ofSocial Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999).
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North Carolina were free to travel to Virginia and purchase tickets there.
Consequently, the interest was described as accommodating the policies of
states having lotteries and states that regard lotteries as undesirable. With
little analysis, the Court deemed this interest in accommodating state policies to be "substantial" under CentralHudson's second prong.9'
The Court then went on to consider the "fit" between the regulatory
scheme and this postulated interest-addressed by prongs three and four.
With respect to whether the statute directly advanced the asserted interest,
Justice White concluded that it was not appropriate to look solely at the peculiar circumstances of one broadcaster; instead, the Court had to consider
the overall operation of the statute. As to broadcasters in general, the prohibition advanced the interest in accommodation. Moreover, even looking
solely at the respondent's unique situation, the statute resulted in some reduction in lottery advertising reaching North Carolinians, and this was
enough of an impact to find that the statute "directly advanced" the asserted
interest. 92 Turning to the question of whether the prohibition was more extensive than necessary, Justice White appeared to apply a rather relaxed
standard, requiring only a "reasonable" connection between means and
end.93 No inquiry was made as to whether there was a less burdensome
policy that would have accommodated the conflicting state policies with
less intrusion on commercial speech.
Edge Broadcastingis relevant to tobacco advertising controls, because
it addresses a situation in which advertising promotes a legal transaction but
also encourages similar transactions that would be illegal. It is unlawful in
all states for persons under the age of eighteen to purchase tobacco. Thus,
even though tobacco advertising proposes a transaction that is lawful for
those over eighteen, and presumably no tobacco company would adopt advertising overtly directed at those under eighteen, it is arguably appropriate
to curtail advertising likely to reach a significant number of underage persons in order to avoid promoting what is in fact an illegal transaction.94
Edge Broadcastingcan be cited for the proposition that it is only necessary
that advertising reach a relatively small percentage of persons for whom the
transaction is illegal in order to justify regulation under this rationale.
Only three years later, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,95 the

Court embraced a much more speech-protective attitude toward commercial
advertising.96 The Court ruled unanimously that a Rhode Island statute
91 See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 426.
92 See id. at431-35.
93 Id. at 429.
94 Indeed, the FDA drew upon this rationale in its Final Regulations. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
95 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
96 This shift was foreshadowed by Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995), where
the Court unanimously struck down a federal statute that prohibited labels on beer cans and bottles from
displaying the alcoholic content of the beer. The Court found that although the government's interestpreventing "strength wars"-may be substantial, the regulation did not directly advance the interest, and
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banning the advertisement of liquor prices in that state, other than in pointof-sale displays, violated the First Amendment. The state argued that the
purpose of the statute was to reduce consumption of alcoholic beverages. It
reasoned that the ban on price advertising would limit price competition,
which in turn would increase the price of liquor, which would depress demand and consumption. Not a single Justice agreed that this justification
was sufficient to sustain the statute. All agreed that if Rhode Island wanted
to suppress demand for liquor, it could easily adopt alternative regulations
less burdensome on commercial speech, such as increasing state liquor
taxes or imposing minimum price controls.
Although the bottom line in 44 Liquormart was unanimous, the Court
was badly fragmented as to the rationale. Indeed, no opinion captured a
majority on the crucial issues. Justice Stevens wrote the lead opinion,
joined in part by all Justices, in part by two different combinations of three
other Justices, and in part by only two other Justices. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on the ground that longstanding historical practice
rather than the Central Hudson test should govern in this area; but since
none of the briefs contained enough information about historical practice
regarding price advertising to permit him to resolve the issue on that basis,
he simply deferred to the judgment of his colleagues. 97 Justice Thomas
concurred in the judgment, in an opinion that would have rejected Central
Hudson outright by limiting commercial speech regulations to illegal transactions and false advertising.9 8 Justice O'Connor, joined by three other
Justices, concurred in the judgment in an opinion that said the issue should
be resolved by applying CentralHudson, which she regarded as being implicitly abandoned by Justice Stevens's opinion.99 Justice Souter's position
is somewhat perplexing. He joined all of Justice O'Connor's opinion-the
least speech-protective-but also joined selective parts of Justice Stevens's
opinion that O'Connor and her other compatriots declined to join.'00
The precise holding of 44 Liquormart should have no direct impact on
proposed cigarette advertising restrictions because none of those initiatives
single out price advertising for proscription. The case is nevertheless significant for the fate of cigarette advertising restrictions, for three reasons.
First, 44 Liquormart creates uncertainty about the status of the Central
Hudson test, and in particular about whether a majority of the Court may
conclude that truthful advertising for a lawful product like liquor or cigarettes is subject to the same protection as political speech under the First
reventing "strength wars"--may be substantial, the regulation did not directly advance the interest, and
moreover that less intrusive alternatives were available. Id. at 491. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion that urged that the Court abandon CentralHudson. See id. at 493.
97 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517-18.
98 See id. at 518-28.
99 See id. at 528-34.

10o See id. at 488-89; 528.
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Amendment. Justice Thomas is already committed to this position. Justice
Stevens did not quite say that CentralHudson should be abandoned, but he
has in effect adopted this position in prior separate opinions, 1 ' making him
a reasonably certain second vote. And Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined the portion of Stevens's plurality opinion which appeared to recast Central Hudson as imposing a standard of strict scrutiny where
prohibitions against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech for a lawful
product are at issue. ° 2
Second, all Justices appeared to agree that the Rhode Island ban on
price advertising should be struck down because "less burdensome" alternatives were available. This may signal an invigoration of the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test into something approximating the "least restrictive alternative" requirement imposed elsewhere under First Amendment
law.10 3 As Justice Thomas astutely observed, such an understanding of
prong four, "if applied consistently in future cases," could result in outcomes indistinguishable from those reached under his preferred approach of
limiting permissible commercial speech regulations to illegal transactions
and misleading speech. As he explained, the Stevens and O'Connor opinions would appear to commit the courts to striking down restrictions on
speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on speech regarding lawful activity at all) would be an equally effective
method of dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that directly banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or
otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at
least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the product would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with
such a purpose would fail the fourth prong of the CentralHudson test.' 4
Third, in Part VI of his opinion, Justice Stevens considered and rejected two arguments in support of liquor advertising restrictions that the
Court had endorsed in the 1986 case Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico.'05 Both of these arguments would almost certainly be relied upon in justifying controls on tobacco advertising. Part VI
was joined by Justice Thomas but not Justice Souter. Thus, the vote on this
part was four to four, with Justice Scalia a scratch.
101See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 The Stevens opinion stated that such restrictions must be reviewed with "special care" under

Central Hudson, and that such speech prohibitions will "rarely survive constitutional review." 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
103 The Court expressly rejected application of the "least restrictive means" test in commercial
speech cases in Boardof Trustees, State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989) and Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995). The Court was concerned that this formulation would be
interpreted as imposing "a heavy burden on the State." Boardof Trustees, 492 U.S. at 471 (citing, inter
alia, Shelton v. Bucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960)).
104 See 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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The first of the two arguments rejected by Stevens is the so-called
greater-includes-the-lesser idea. At issue in Posadas was a Puerto Rican
statute that permitted gambling casinos-a lawful enterprise in Puerto
Rico-to be advertised in other states, but not in Puerto Rico itself. In upholding this scheme, the Court majority stated that there was no doubt that
Puerto Rico had the greater power to ban casinos altogether. Thus, there
the lesser step of banning advertising for
should be no objection if it0 took
6
Rico.1
Puerto
within
casinos
Justice Stevens would have overruled this aspect of Posadas if he had
the votes, t1 7 and in all likelihood the greater-includes-the-lesser notion is
dead. Although she did not specifically mention the argument, Justice
O'Connor conceded in her concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart that Posadasis out of line with other recent decisions applying the CentralHudson
test, and she appeared to acquiesce in confining the decision to its facts. In
any event, the greater-includes-the-lesser theory of Posadas ought to be reThe government
jected as a premise for commercial speech regulation.'
can ban virtually any commercial product as long as it has a plausible reason-even oleomargarine was banned at one time, and this was upheld by
the Supreme Court. 0 9 Thus, the greater-includes-the-lesser idea would
permit the government to ban truthful advertising for virtually any product
that is not itself protected by the Constitution. This is surely overkill, for it
would permit the prohibition of commercial advertising where the benefits
of the speech far outweigh any external costs associated with it.
106See id. at 345-47.
107 See 517 U.S. at 509-12.
108 Justice Stevens cited two homely examples in support of the proposition that the greater does
not always include the lesser, at least when the lesser involves the transmission of information. With all
due respect, I find neither example especially persuasive. The first is drawn from an old proverb: "Give
a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime." 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511 n.19. Based on this, Justice Stevens observed, "it may prove more injurious to
prevent people from teaching others how to fish than to prevent fish from being sold." Id. at 511. But it
is far from obvious that teaching people how to do things themselves is more important than giving them
access to a market where those things can be bought and sold. Suppose we substitute brain surgery for
fishing in Justice Stevens's sentence. The sentence would now read: "it may prove more injurious to
prevent people from teaching others how to perform brain surgery than to prevent them from acquiring
the services of a brain surgeon." Admittedly, a ban on educating brain surgeons would be bad. But as
long as we could import brain surgeons from abroad, it would probably be better than having everyone
engage in do-it-yourself brain surgery. Justice Stevens's second example involves bicycles: "Similarly," he says, "a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that
prohibits bicycle riding within city limits." Id. This example seems to turn on the notion that riding is
prohibited only within one municipality; thus, if you can teach someone how to ride, he can always take
the bicycle to another locality and ride there. But what if bicycle riding is banned everywhere? If bicycle riding is banned everywhere, teaching someone to ride a bike does little good. On the other hand,
since presumably most people who want to ride a bike could teach themselves how to do it after some
trial and error, the ban on instruction would be less intrusive.
109 See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888). See generally, Geoffrey P. Miller,
PublicChoice at the Dawn of the SpecialInterest State: The Story of Butter andMargarine,77 CAL. L.
REv. 83 (1989).
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The second argument rejected by Part VI of Justice Stevens's opinion-also derived from the decision in Posadas-isthat a special exception
should be recognized for advertising that pertains to "vice activity."" The
problem with this argument, according to Justice Stevens, is that it is hard
to define what constitutes a "vice." Because "[a]lmost any product that
poses some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be
characterized by a state legislature as relating to 'vice activity,"'"' recognizing such an exception would have one of two unfortunate consequences.
It would allow "state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple expedient of placing the 'vice' label on selected lawful activities," or it would
' 12 require "the federal courts to establish a federal common law of vice."'
Whether Justice Stevens has the votes ultimately to inter the "vice exception" is less clear. The Court made some sympathetic noises about the
vice exception in Edge Broadcasting"' (although it did not reach the issue
of whether such an exception would have justified a complete ban on lottery advertising). Furthermore, it is not clear that the definitional problems
are as insuperable as Justice Stevens suggests. For example, we could take
a cue from poor Justice Scalia, sitting there on the sidelines, and adopt an
historical test for vice activity.'14 If something has a reasonably long his-

tory of regulation in a majority of jurisdictions-for example, if sales to
minors are prohibited or other significant restrictions on access are imposed-then it would be reasonable for the State to regard it as a vice. This
sort of test would suggest that liquor, cigarettes, and gambling are vices, but
eating steak and eggs and thereby endangering your cholesterol level is not.
Alternatively, we could at least recognize a separate category for advertising "addictive" substances, and borrow medical definitions of addiction.
The FDA, for example, has stated that substances are addictive if (1) they
are mood altering; (2) they result in regular and compulsive use; (3) they
cause physical dependence characterized by withdrawal symptoms; and (4)
the body develops a tolerance toward them." 5 The Court could simply recognize a special category of addictive substances and defer to the FDA's
definition of what that means.

Ito

See Posadas,478 U.S. at 346.
11144Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514.
112 Id.
113 See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 426.
114

See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has often sug-

gested that broad language in the Constitution's Bill of Rights should be interpreted by looking to longstanding historical practices. See, eg., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (1995)
(First Amendment); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (substantive due process); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (procedural due process).
115 See Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over NicotineContaining Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,492-93 (1995). See
also Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, andAdvertising, 77 IOWA. L. REV. 909 (1992).
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In short, after 44 Liquormartrestrictions on nondeceptive tobacco advertising will be much more difficult to justify than before. Most significantly, support on the Court for the Central Hudson test appears to be
eroding. That test, whatever its other merits and demerits, implicitly recognizes that advertising may generate net external costs in situations other
than the promotion of illegal transactions or consumer deception. At least
some Justices, however, are anxious to endorse a stronger bright-line test
that would block the government from controlling these other types of external costs through commercial speech restrictions. Even if CentralHudson is not jettisoned outright, 44 Liquormart may signal a new skepticism
on the part of the Court toward any use of commercial speech restrictions to
curtail demand for lawful products where other strategies for controlling
demand such as price increases, taxes, or other rationing mechanisms have
not been fully exploited. Finally, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument
of Posadas is almost certainly dead, as may be the argument that there is a
special exception for vices or addictive products.
The Court has not been steadfast in its attitude toward commercial
speech. Ever since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.1 16 was decided in 1976, the Justices have tacked
back and forth in the degree of value they attribute to commercial advertising and in their willingness to defer to legislative and regulatory bodies that
propose commercial speech regulations. Recent decisions culminating in
44 Liquormart suggest that the Court is currently tacking strongly toward
the pro-commercial speech position, and that it is inclined not to give much
deference to those who believe less speech will benefit consumers and society more generally. This new tack is taking place just as new types of advertising regulations on tobacco advertising are being put in.place, with
further regulations likely to follow.
B. Proposalsto Regulate Tobacco Advertising
The nation is moving inexorably toward a new regime of tobacco advertising controls. The minimum content of those controls is established by
the recent AG Settlement between the state attorneys general and the tobacco companies! n 7 Further restrictions could come from several sources:
a Supreme Court decision upholding the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco,"1 8
which would revive the FDA's 1996 regulations concerning tobacco advertising; new federal legislation imposing additional controls; or a settlement
between the tobacco companies and the federal government in the federal
government's promised cost-recovery action against the tobacco companies. 9 Whatever the future may hold, it is doubtful that the AG Settlement
116 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

117 See supranote 17.
118 See supranote 9.
119 See supranote 20.
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will represent the last word on tobacco advertising restrictions. Public support for aggressive regulation of tobacco products remains very high, and it
seems reasonable to assume that some type of strong controls on tobacco
advertising will emerge in the near future.
Thus, it is worth taking a brief look at the regulatory regimes established by the FDA's regulations, the Global Settlement, and the AG Settlement in order to gain a sense of the types of advertising controls that are
likely to be adopted. I will start with the FDA regulations because they
have received the most complete public justification. I will then provide
briefer descriptions of the restrictions contained in the Global Settlement
and the AG Settlement, which can be viewed as maximal and minimal
variations on the basic structure put in place by the FDA regulations.
1. The FDA Regulations. The advertising restrictions contained in the
1996 FDA regulations are designed to reduce the "product appeal" of tobacco for youths under eighteen.1 20 No government interest in suppressing
demand among adults is asserted as part of the justification for the regulations. As the FDA explained, its restrictions are formulated "to preserve the
informational components of advertising and labeling which can provide
useful information for adult smokers, while eliminating the imagery and
color that make advertising appealing and compelling to children and adolescents under 18 years of age.
The FDA's strategy for reducing the exposure of youths to alluring toFirst, tobacco adbacco advertising includes seven principal restrictions.
vertising is limited to FDA-approved media, including print publications,
billboards, direct mail, and point-of-sale displays.123 Second, tobacco advertising in these approved media is restricted to black text on white background (i.e., "tombstone" advertising), unless the advertising appears in an
adult publication, defined as one with no more than fifteen percent youth
readership or total youth readership of two million, or appears in an establishment restricted to adults, such as a bar. Use of color and images continues to be permitted in adult publications and in adults-only commercial
establishments. Third, no billboard may advertise tobacco products within
one thousand feet of schools or public playgrounds. Fourth, all tobacco advertising must include, in addition to the Surgeon General's warnings, the
label "Nicotine-Delivery Device for Persons 18 or Older." Fifth, tobacco
120See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,44,465 (1996).
121 Id.
122 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.32, 897.34 (1998).
123 By statute, all advertising of tobacco products by broadcasters has long been prohibited. See
Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 6,79 Stat. 283 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1965)) (prohibiting all advertising of
cigarettes "on any medium of electronic communication" effective January 1, 1971). This statute was

upheld in Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court), aff'd, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972)-a decision that predates the Court's extension of significant First Amendment protection to commercial advertising.
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brand names may not be used in connection with promotional merchandise,
such as t-shirts or ashtrays. Sixth, tobacco companies may not offer promotional gifts, with or without brand names, in return for proof of purchase
of tobacco products. Finally, tobacco brand names or symbols may not be
used in connection with sponsoring of concerts or sporting events, such as
the Virginia Slims Tennis Tournament.
In its statement of basis and purposes accompanying the final rules, the
FDA argued that these restrictions were warranted because tobacco advertising, if it does not propose an illegal transaction, is at least related to an
illegal transaction, that is, the sale of tobacco to minors, now prohibited in
all fifty states.124 The FDA also sought to demonstrate that its restrictions
were consistent with the Supreme Court's Central Hudson test. The government's interest, protecting the health of individuals under the age of
eighteen, is clearly substantial. As to whether the restrictions would "directly advance" that interest, the FDA summarized a wide range of evidence-including expert opinion, advertising theory, survey data, empirical
studies drawing on international experience, anecdotal evidence (e.g., the
Joe Camel campaign), industry statements, and consensus reports-in an effort to show that advertising may influence the decision of teens to smoke,
125
and that restrictions on advertising reduce the incidence of teen smoking.
Finally, with respect to each of its proposed regulations, the FDA argued
that its restrictions were narrowly tailored to reach only those media and
aspects of advertising that would have the greatest effect on youngsters:
FDA is not banning outdoor advertising; it is restricting it so that it does not
unavoidably confront children at play. It is not banning print advertising. It is
restricting the use of images and color, which are particularly appealing to
children, in publications that have a large number of young readers under the
age of 18 .... [FDA] is permitting companies to sponsor [events] in the corporate name in order to engender good will, but preventing them from using the
brand specific attractive imagery that is influential with young people. Finally,
it is prohibiting the use of branded promotional items because it is the young
who find particular value in these items.126
The tobacco industry vigorously disputed the FDA's constitutional
analysis in comments filed with the agency before it promulgated its final
rules. Moreover, the industry filed suit in federal district court in North
Carolina seeking to invalidate the advertising restrictions. The litigation resulted in a judgment that the FDA lacks jurisdiction over tobacco, though
neither the district court nor the court of appeals reached the merits of the
industry's First Amendment claims.
124See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,470-71.
'25 See id. at 44,488-89 (summarizing types of evidence).

126 Id. at 44,497.
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2. The Global Settlement. The proposed global settlement announced
in June 1997 took the FDA advertising regulations as a baseline and upped
the ante. The public health groups that participated in the negotiations have
long been committed to strong restraints on tobacco advertising. Evidently,
the tobacco companies were willing to make additional concessions on the
advertising front in return for securing the public health groups' endorsement of legislated liability limitations for big tobacco.
The Global Settlement basically took the FDA's advertising restrictions as a template and added some new twists in the direction of further
limitations. 27 Thus, rather than requiring FDA approval of advertising in
new media, the settlement would have expressly banned any tobacco advertising on the Internet. In addition to the requirement of black-on-white
tombstone ads in all newspapers and magazines with a substantial youth
audience, the settlement would have prohibited any use of human images,
such as the Marlboro Man, or cartoon characters, such as Joe Camel, in any
advertising. Rather than ban billboards within one thousand feet of schools
and playgrounds, the settlement would have prohibited all billboard advertising of tobacco products. Beyond prohibiting the use of tobacco brand
names in connection with the sponsorship of concerts and sporting events,
the settlement would also have prohibited indirect payments to movie or
music video producers to glamorize smoking. Beyond requiring the label
"nicotine-delivery device" on all advertising, the settlement would have
mandated even more emphatic warning labels (e.g., "WARNING: Smoking can kill you") covering twenty-five percent of the front panels of packages. The Global Settlement would also have imposed severe restrictions
on point-of-sale advertising and displays.
The Global Settlement was not promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and hence the negotiators did not favor us with a
comprehensive statement of basis and purpose such as accompanies the
FDA's rules. We thus have no authoritative explanation for why the negotiators selected the particular package of upward "ratchets" in advertising
restrictions that we find in the settlement document. In general, the modifications seem either to reflect particular bugaboos of the public health community-Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man 128-or to undo certain
compromises that the FDA made in formulating its regulations, such as
limiting the billboard ban to those near schools and playgrounds and dropping the proposed regulation's requirement of additional and more emphatic
warnings, or to legislate proposals that the public health community had
127 See Global Settlement at 8-10.
128 The "Preamble" to the Global Settlement states that the "new regime" to be enacted into law
would "[g]o beyond FDA's current regulations to ban all outdoor tobacco advertising and to eliminate
cartoon characters and human figures, such as Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man, two tobacco icons
which the public health community has long assailed as advertising appealing to our nation's youth."
Global Settlement at 2.
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urged in the FDA rulemaking process without success, such as an express
ban on advertising in the Internet.
The Global Settlement called for federal legislation to be enacted incorporating its proposed package of advertising restrictions. In addition,
the parties agreed that, once the legislation was signed into law, the tobacco
companies would enter into consent decrees containing identical restrictions. 129 The Global Settlement explained the need for adoption of parallel
provisions in the consent decrees in the following revealing paragraph:
[T]he parties recognize that certain provisions of the consent decrees and
the agreement may require them to act (or refrain from acting) in a manner that
they otherwise might claim would violate the federal or state constitutions.
They will therefore in the consent decrees expressly waive any claim that the
provisions of the consent decrees or the agreement violate the federal or state
constitutions. The consent decrees will also state that if a provision of the Act
covered by the decrees is subsequently declared unconstitutional,
the provision
130
remains an enforceable term of the consent decrees.
In other words, the consent decrees were to function as a backstop if, as the
parties thought not unlikely, the legislated advertising restrictions were declared unconstitutional. By signing the consent decrees and waiving any
constitutional objections to the advertising restrictions in the consent decrees, the tobacco companies would, as a matter of contract, guarantee what
might not be achievable by way of direct regulation.
3. The AG Settlement. The provisions of the AG Settlement-which,
unlike the FDA regulations and the Global Settlement provisions, are almost certain to take effect in the near future13'-represent a further evolution in the basic template established in the FDA regulations. Now,
however, the ratchet has moved downward132somewhat, back toward and in
some respects below the FDA regulations.
The AG Settlement, like the Global Settlement, prohibits any use of
cartoon characters such as Joe Camel in any advertising. 133 But it does not
follow the Global Settlement in banning human images, nor does it follow
the FDA in allowing only black-on-white tombstone ads in all newspaper
and magazines with a substantial youth audience. Thus, the Marlboro Man
will live on-in full color-in magazine advertising. On the other hand, the
AG Settlement, like the Global Settlement, bans virtually all tobacco ad-

129 See Global Settlement at 27.
130 Id. at 28.

131 See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
132 See AG Settlement art. III, §§ (a)-(r) (noting advertising restrictions).
133 See id. § (b) (noting ban on use of cartoons).
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vertising on billboards or in transit advertising. 34 Moreover, like the FDA
regulations and the Global Settlement, under the AG Settlement the use of
tobacco brand name merchandise is prohibited, sponsorships of concerts
and athletic events are phased out, except for certain dispensations to
Brown & Williamson Corporation, and payments to movie or music video
producers to promote tobacco products are banned.135 Unlike the Global
Settlement, however, the AG Settlement makes no effort to impose new
warning labels on tobacco products. Nor does it contain any restrictions on
advertising on the Internet, or on point-of-sale advertising or displays.
Because the AG Settlement, unlike the Global Settlement, forswears
any reliance on federal legislation, the advertising restrictions are adopted
only as consent decree provisions. Nevertheless, the AG Settlement contemplates that the States may enact future legislation that further restricts
the marketing of tobacco products. The settlement attempts to pave the way
for these future legislative enactments by including a provision in which the
tobacco companies promise not to lobby against, or otherwise oppose, the
adoption of an enumerated list of future types of state statutory restrictions. 36 In other words, the AG Settlement includes not only a waiver of
commercial speech rights, but also a partial waiver of political speech rights
by the tobacco companies.
Overall, both the Global Settlement's and the AG Settlement's restrictions remain comfortably within the general rationale of the FDA's rules:
protecting children from advertising likely to glamorize smoking or at least
make it seem like a broadly acceptable adult activity. Thus, there is no attempt in either of the settlements to ban "hard" information about tobacco
products, such as information about prices, new products, or relative safety
claims. The focus throughout is on "soft" information-cartoon imagery,
billboards, brand name merchandise, sponsorship of concerts and sporting
events. And there is no effort to end all advertising in print media, direct
mail solicitation, or point-of-sale displays, where hard information about
prices or new products would most likely be disseminated.
In general, it would seem that both settlements give up something relative to the FDA rules on the narrow tailoring front. For example, certain
forms of advertising (e.g., cartoons) are banned in all media without regard
to the percentage of youth readership, and all billboard advertising is
banned, not simply advertising in the proximity of schools and playgrounds. 3 7 On the other hand, the settlement provisions arguably gain
134 Id. § (d) (eliminating outdoor advertising and transit advertisements).
131 Id. § (c) (limiting tobacco brand name sponsorships); id. § (f) (banning tobacco brand name
merchandise:); id. § (e) (prohibiting payments related to tobacco products and media).
136 See id. § (m) (limiting lobbying). See infra note 184-85 and accompanying text for a further
description of this interesting provision.
137 In this light, it is interesting to think of the Global Settlement and the AG Settlement as examples of "negotiated rulemaking," and to consider what light this sheds on the FDA's mandatory rules.
See generally Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the Administrative State, 41 UCLA L. REv. I
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something in return in terms of directly advancing the government interest
in discouraging youth smoking: a universal ban on cartoons and billboards
is likely to be more effective than a selective ban. The AG Settlement, by
giving up on requiring tombstone advertising in magazines, probably eliminates the single most contentious First Amendment issue and goes a long
way toward increasing the odds of securing judicial approval. But as noted
earlier, the AG Settlement is probably just the floor in terms of new advertising restrictions: more far-reaching efforts are surely around the comer.
III. THE TRANSACTION STRUCTURE APPLIED TO TOBACCO ADVERTISING

We are now in a position to consider more fully the transaction structure that should apply to tobacco advertising. The logical progression of
the issues would seem to be as follows: (1) Are tobacco advertising restrictions of the sort adopted by the FDA and contained in the Global Settlement and the AG Settlement examples of regulations as to which the
government's police power trumps the tobacco companies' First Amendment rights? (2) If not, are the First Amendment rights of the tobacco
companies in this context subject to waiver in negotiated agreements like
the Global Settlement and the AG Settlement; that is, are these rights protected by a property rule as opposed to an inalienability rule? (3) If the
First Amendment rights of the tobacco companies are alienable, but for
some reason an agreement satisfactory to all sides cannot be reached (for
example, if the federal government and big tobacco cannot reach a satisfactory settlement agreement in the federal government's projected costrecovery suit), is the government permitted to condemn the tobacco companies' First Amendment rights in return for the payment of just compensation; that is, are those rights protected by a liability rule?
In considering these questions, I will assume that the regulation of tobacco advertising takes approximately the form reflected in the FDA regulations and the two settlements. These are fairly draconian regulations
relative to the status quo ante: all advertising is banned in certain mediabillboards and merchandise-and content restrictions are imposed-no cartoons and possibly no color or image advertising. It is possible, of course,
to imagine even more draconian regulations, such as the total ban on tobacco advertising adopted by the Canadian Parliament. 138 But I will assume
that the restrictions contained in the FDA regulations and in the two settlements most closely approximate the type of restraints that are likely to be
adopted in the near future.
(1997) (reviewing experience with negotiated rulemaking). Left to their own devices, the parties negotiated advertising restrictions that tend to be more bright-line and simpler to administer than those contained
in the FDA regulations. This suggests perhaps that regulated parties place a higher value on comprehensibility and ease of administration and a lower value on fine tuning of policy than do agencies.
138The total ban was struck down on free speech grounds by the Canadian Supreme Court. See
RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] S.C.R. 199.
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A. A Police PowerRule?
The first question that must be confronted is whether the proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising would violate the First Amendment at all;
in other words, whether such advertising would be subject to a police power
rule. If a police power rule applies, then all other questions about the transaction structure become moot. Any decision by the government to purchase
tobacco advertising rights, or to pay just compensation for taking such
rights, would be an act of gratuitous generosity, not something compelled
by the transaction structure.
Under the general theory of the transaction structure set forth in Part I,
the tobacco advertising prohibited by recent initiatives would be governed
by a police power rule if we conclude that the public goods value of the
right is negative (because EBcr < ECcr) and exceeds in absolute magnitude
the private value of the right (assumed to be positive). Given these conclusions, in other words, tobacco advertising would fall under Equation Three:
(3)

PPR, PGVcr + PVcr < 0 or
PGVr < -PVcr

This requires, in turn, that we consider the external benefits and external
costs associated with tobacco advertising and compare the resulting PGVcr
to the private value of tobacco advertising to the tobacco companies.
1. The External Benefits of Tobacco Advertising. As a general matter,
the external benefits of commercial advertising are probably small. This is
not to say that commercial advertising does not contain valuable information, especially for consumers. But it is in the very nature of commercial
speech that to the extent it conveys valuable information to consumers, that
value is largely internalized by the purveyor of the information and the recipient of the information through the commercial transaction that the information is designed to promote. As Professor Farber has explained:
Most of the benefit of product advertising is captured by the producer itself in
the form of increased sales. Consequently, we would not expect severe underproduction of commercial speech. Even casual exposure to the American media is enough to139convince most people that advertising is already produced at
an ample level.
To illustrate, suppose convenience store A sells a pack of cigarettes for
$3.00, and convenience store B sells the same pack for $2.75. Convenience
store B will have an incentive to advertise the existence of its lower price to
139 Farber, supra note 35, at 565. See also Posner, supranote 35, at 22.
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the extent that the advertising generates additional sales and profits that exceed the costs of the advertising. Consumers will benefit from the information to the extent it permits them to save $0.25 per pack of cigarettes. But
every consumer who benefits from the information by saving this amount of
money will also be generating additional sales and presumably profits for
convenience store B. Thus, every consumer who benefits from the information also generates parallel gains for the purveyor of information. The
value of the information is thus internalized, at least in large part, through
the commercial transaction that the information is designed to promote.
It is important not to exaggerate this point by suggesting that commercial advertising generates no external benefits. Unless the seller of the advertised product is able to engage in perfect price discrimination among
consumers, consumers as a group will enjoy a "consumer surplus" from the
transaction that is not recaptured by the seller. 40 This surplus can be regarded as a type of external benefit of the advertising that stimulates these
transactions. Moreover, as Judge Posner has observed, some advertising
will contain general information about products and services which may
lead to higher sales for other sellers of similar products-an external benefit
for the rivals of the purveyor of the information.14 But these kinds of external benefits associated with advertising are thought to be relatively small,
at least relative to the external benefits associated with other kinds of
speech such as political speech, scientific speech, or artistic expression.
Notice further that the clearest examples of external benefits from
commercial advertising, such as consumer surplus, are generated largely by
"hard" information like price advertising or information about new products
or product features. The advertising restrictions in the FDA regulations and
the two settlements contain no prohibition on the communication of this
kind of information. Instead, they interdict the flow of certain "soft" information, such as cartoon images, and the dissemination of information
through visual media, such as billboards, where emotional content tends to
predominate over hard information.
The argument has been made that without vivid imagery, it may be
more difficult for tobacco companies to draw attention to important hard information, like lower prices or safer cigarettes.142 But this claim is questionable. After all, information about retail prices of consumer products is
typically conveyed in black-on-white printed ads, such as the grocery and
drug store ads that fill up the inner pages of weekday newspapers. And advertisements for new products, such as new drugs, are often placed in print
media, where the features can be explained in a more satisfactory fashion
than would be the case on a billboard or a television or radio spot.
140 Consumer surplus is a measure of the value that consumers as a group attach to a product above
the price they pay for it. For a concise exposition of the concept, see POSNER supranote 45, at 277.
141 See Posner, supranote 35, at 22.
142 See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,591 (summarizing comments).
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Thus, it is probably safe to conclude that although the advertising prohibited by the proposed settlement would generate some external benefits,
primarily by alerting consumers to better prices or superior tobacco products being offered by some manufacturers or retailers relative to others,
those external beriefits are not large. Most of the consumer surplus that advertising helps consumers to obtain will not be extinguished by the proposed regulations. And there is little danger that tobacco companies and
retailers will stop generating information valuable to consumers altogether.
2. The External Costs of Tobacco Advertising. At first blush, it might
seem that the external costs of tobacco advertising must be extremely large.
It turns out, however, that the magnitude of external costs associated with
such advertising is highly debatable. There is no doubt that, as a general
matter, the costs of smoking are high. Consider the following factual summary in the FDA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
Approximately 50 million Americans currently smoke cigarettes and another 6 million use smokeless tobacco products. These tobacco products are
responsible for more than 400,000 deaths each year due to cancer, respiratory illnesses, heart disease, and other health problems. Cigarettes kill more Americans
each year than acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), alcohol, car accidents, murders, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires combined. On average,
smokers who die from a disease caused by smoking lose 12 to 15 years of life
because of tobacco use.143
Indeed, on a straight cost-benefit basis, the FDA was able to show that its
proposed regulations were among the most cost-effective social regulations
ever proposed, even assuming relatively low effectiveness rates. For example, assuming that the FDA's regulations reduced youth smoking by 25%,
and using the Office of Management and Budget's current recommended
discount rate of 7%, the cost per life saved was estimated to be only about
$52,000.144 Even on a worst-case scenario, assuming that the regulations
reduced youth smoking by only 2.5%, the cost per life saved was estimated
to be about $525,000 5-- a much lower cost per146life saved than associated
with many environmental and safety regulations.
143 FDA NOPR, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314.
144 See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,599.
145 See id.

146 Environmental and safety regulations are often criticized on the ground that they reflect
widely varying costs per life saved. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) (providing an overview and critique of this literature). One commonly referenced table shows costs per life saved ranging from a low of $100,000 to a high of $72
billion. See id. at 1988-89. Within this range, where exactly the benchmark for regulatory expenditure
should be fixed is, of course, highly debatable. One approach would rely upon so-called "risk-risk" assessment, which attempts to determine the point at which additional expenditures on regulation would
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The key question posed by the proposed transaction structure, however, is not whether the costs of smoking are high, or whether the benefits
of smoking reduction exceed the compliance and regulatory costs of getting
people to stop smoking. Rather, the question is whether the external costs
associated with smoking are high. That question has no simple answer.
The vast preponderance of the costs of smoking are borne by smokers
themselves or their families, and policy analysts disagree sharply about
whether it is proper to classify these costs as "externalities."
a. The External Costs of Smoking.-The conceptual and
normative problems surrounding the question of whether smoking produces
significant external costs can be illustrated by the accompanying table,
which is reproduced from a recent article by Jon Hansen and Kyle Logue
(see Table 3). 147 The first column reflects an estimate of the external costs
and benefits of smoking developed by Willard Manning and a team of
economists in 1991.148 The table shows external costs as having a positive
sign and external benefits as having a negative sign. Using a discount rate
of five percent, Manning and his colleagues found that the external costs of
smoking were small, from thirty-one to fifty-two cents per pack. Specifically, they concluded that nonsmokers subsidize smokers' medical care because smokers use up disproportionately large portions of the pool of health
insurance premiums. On the other hand, smokers subsidize the costs of
providing pensions and insured coverage of nursing home care to nonsmokers because smokers die earlier. The noninsurance externalities referenced
on the table include things like lives lost in fires caused by smoking, fetal
deaths due to women smoking while pregnant, and neonatal intensive care
costs of infants borne to women who smoke while pregnant.
The second column reflects an estimate of the external costs of smoking developed in 1995 by another economist, Kip Viscusi, largely following
the Manning methodology but using a lower discount rate-three percentand updated figures. 149 Viscusi found even smaller external costs; indeed,
the lower end of his range suggests that smoking produces external benefits
of eighteen cents per pack. This conclusion was generated largely by restat-

divert so many resources from other possible regulatory efforts that an additional life would be lost.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria,25 RAND J.
ECON. 94 (1994). This method generates benchmarks ranging from $10 million to $50 million per life
saved-far in excess of the costs per life saved under FDA advertising restrictions even under the worstcase assumption about their effectiveness.
147 Jon D. Hansen & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:The Economic Casefor Ex Post Incentive-BasedRegulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1242 (1998).
148 WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS (1991); see also Willard
Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and DrinkersPay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604 (1989).
149 See W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (James M. Porterba ed., 1995).
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ESTIMATED EXTERNAL COSTS PER PACK OF CIGARETTES
HANSON &
COSTS

MANNING

VISCUSI

ET AL.

LOGUE'S
ALTERNATIVE

ASSUMPTIONS
Medical Care

$ 0.26

$ 0.50

$ 0.50

Sick Leave

0.01

0.01

0.01

Group Life Insurance

0.05

0.13

.013

Nursing Home Care

-0.03

-0.22

-

Retirement Pension

-0.24

-1.10

-

Fire Insurance

0.02

0.02

0.02

Taxes on Earnings

0.09

0.35

Total Insurance

0.15

-0.32

Costs to Smoker

-

-

ETS
Other

0.66
5.93

0.14
-

-

0.25

Total Noninsurane

0.16 to 0.37

0.14 to 0.73

6.32

Total

0.31 to 0.52

-0.18 to 0.41

6.98

Table 3
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ing the analysis of insurance externalities, in particular by adjusting upward
the estimate of savings in pension, social security, and nursing home benefits due to premature deaths.
The third column shows Hansen and Logue's own estimation of the
external costs of smoking. Although they adopted most of Viscusi's numbers and his discount rate, they concluded that smoking generates external
costs of a staggering seven dollars per pack. The largest source of this extreme divergence is that Hansen and Logue include nearly six dollars per
pack of costs to the individual smoker and his or her family, including
medical expenses not covered by insurance, wages not received because of
illness and early death, and the monetized value of early death and disability. In addition, on policy grounds Hansen and Logue reject any savings in
pension, social security, and nursing home costs associated with early
death. They also add in the costs of second-hand smoke exposure, although
the estimated external costs here may be small.'5s
The huge disparity in external cost estimates derived by Manning and
Viscusi, on the one hand, and by Hansen and Logue, on the other, is primarily attributable to conceptual and normative disagreements, not to disagreements about the facts. The biggest single issue concerns whether
additional lifetime costs to smokers, such as lost wages, unreimbursed
medical expenditures, and the monetized value of premature death and disability, should be counted as external costs. Manning and Viscusi assume
that because these costs are eventually borne by the smoker or the smoker's
family, they are fully internalized when the smoker makes the decision
whether to continue smoking or to quit. Hansen and Logue, in contrast, argue that because of informational imperfections and distorted decisionmaking associated with addictive behaviors, smokers do not properly
evaluate these costs and the impact of these costs on family members when
they decide to continue smoking or to quit."' In effect, Hansen and Logue
argue that the risk of illness and early death that the "future self' and family
members incur because of smoking should be regarded as an external
152 cost
to the "present self' who decides whether to light another cigarette.
The second issue, which accounts for slightly less than one dollar of
external costs, concerns whether the lower costs that the government and
private pensions incur because of the premature deaths of smokers should
be counted as an external benefit. Manning and Viscusi assume that if the
higher medical insurance costs borne by nonsmokers because of the ill15o The Environmental Protection Agency has declared that environmental tobacco smoke causes
cancer in humans, but the tobacco industry has mounted a serious challenge to the agency's methodology.
See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp.2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (invalidating EPA's risk assessment for procedural violations and cataloguing methodological objections).
151See Hansen & Logue, supranote 147, at 1240-41. By far the largest component of these costs is
the monetized value to the smoker of premature death and disability, said to be $5.00 per pack. Lost wages
are only $0.86 per pack and out-of-pocket medical expenses a tiny $0.07 per pack. See id. at 1241 n.347.
152 Id. at 1205-09.
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nesses of smokers are to be treated as an external cost of smoking, then the
lower Social Security and Medicare costs attributable to the early deaths of
smokers should be counted as an external benefit of smoking. Hansen and
Logue, in contrast, argue that no early-death pension saving "credit" should
be included in the calculus.1 53 Although they again rely on informational
imperfections in making this argument, their most forceful argument here is
a moral one. They contend that it is inappropriate to consider early death a
"social benefit" in any effort to determine correct social policy because, for
example, "we do not hear polluters urging policymakers to take into acthat would result if Congress would
count the many pension-saving deaths
154
only leave polluters unregulated."'
I will not attempt here to arbitrate between these competing positions
regarding the magnitude of the external costs of smoking, at least with respect to adult smokers. Resolution of this debate would require the exploration of a number of extremely difficult questions, such as whether people
suffer from cognitive biases that prevent them from making correct assessments of distant and uncertain costs, 55 and in particular whether addictive
substances like tobacco distort the processes of individual decisionmaking
in ways that prevent rational assessments of future benefits and costs.
These issues cannot be resolved by applying a single "correct" definition of
externalities to the facts as we know them. Either the definition of what
constitutes an externality is contestable or, if one wants to insist on a single
definition, there is a contestable claim that the definition should be modified in favor of an alternative measure of benefits and costs. At its core, the
dispute centers on whether we insist on a model of individual decisionmaking that adheres to the rational choice assumptions on which all economic analysis and cost-benefit analysis rests, or whether we are willing to
make adjustments to that model in particular cases based on arguments that
the model produces distorted results or results that are incompatible with
widely shared moral intuitions. Either way, the choice of model is debatable and cannot be resolved dogmatically.
In the context of the current debate over cigarette advertising, however,
it seems that there is a way to side-step these conundrums, and that is to recall that the sole objective of the regulations is to discourage children from
smoking. The question may therefore be restated as follows: whether the
future medical costs, lost wages, and lost years of life associated with
smoking should be regarded as being fully internalized by the child when
he or she decides to take up smoking. The answer should be a selfconfident "yes" only if one is prepared to maintain that children have the
153Id. at 1247-54.
154 Id. at 1256.
155See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-

man et al. eds., 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1997).
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same capacities for rationally weighing future costs and benefits that we ordinarily attribute to adults. Few would defend such a position. As the FDA
notes, "[e]ven steadfast defenders of individual choice acknowledge the difficulty of applying the 'market failure' criterion to non-adults."' 5 Thus, in
assessing an advertising policy designed to influence the behavior of children, future costs of the sort included by Hansen and Logue are properly
considered external costs.
The conceptual and normative disagreements about what constitutes an
external cost of smoking nevertheless provide an important caveat about the
utility of the general theoretical framework set forth in Part I. No one
should suppose that deeply controversial normative judgments are avoided
by casting the inquiry in terms of "external benefits" and "external costs."
They jpast emerge at a different point in the analysis. As my colleague
Marty Redish has observed, the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases
have alternated between "paternalistic" and "anti-paternalistic" assumptions
about consumer behavior.'s Under the proposed framework discussed
here, the same conflict emerges, this time in connection with a debate over
the magnitude of the "external costs" attributable to smoking. Paternalistic
assumptions about consumer behavior yield large external costs. Assumptions ground in rugged individualism yield much smaller and perhaps even
negative external costs.
b. The Role of Advertising.-Even if we conclude that smoking is associated with significant external costs, perhaps even of the magnitude of seven dollars per pack, it is still necessary to demonstrate that
advertising is responsible for increasing the incidence of this externalityproducing activity and, conversely, that restricting advertising would cause
incidence of the externality-producing activity to decline. Public health advocates who crusade against smoking find it self-evident that the huge advertising budgets of tobacco companies are largely responsible for the
But when the FDA
persistence of tobacco use, especially among teens.

156

FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,571. The FDA cited two types of evidence in support of

this common sense conclusion. The first consists of studies showing that the implicit time discount rate
used by children falls as they mature. "Infants and young children tend to live very much for the present; the prospect of something only a week in the future usually has little influence over their behavior.
As children get older their time horizons lengthen, but once adult status is reached there seems to be little correlation between time discount and age." Id. (quoting VICTOR R. FucHs, How WE LIVE 228-29
(1983)). The second was a study by economist Frank Chaloupka showing that the pattern of "rational
addiction" thought to exist in the general population, whereby current consumption is a function of both
past and future consumption, does not hold for younger persons, for whom current consumption is a
function only of past but not future consumption. Id. at 44,572 (citing Frank Chaloupka, Rational Addictive Behavior and CigaretteSmoking, 99 J. POL. ECON. 740 (1991)).
'57 Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising andthe FirstAmendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996).
158 See, e.g., Tobacco Advertising and Promotion, in GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE 105-35
(1995). For a review and assessment of the empirical literature on the impact of tobacco advertising on
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sought to demonstrate that its proposed advertising restrictions would "directly advance" the interest in reducing teen smoking within the meaning of
the CentralHudson test, proof of this proposition was hard to come by."'
Here, the disagreements are largely empirical rather than conceptual or
normative. Either advertising influences kids to smoke or it does not. The
reason it is so hard to demonstrate what kind of effect it has is that it is impossible to conduct controlled experiments that would isolate the influence
of advertising from other variables. To take just one example, the FDA relied in its rule making on sampling data from Norway computing the percentages of teenage boys and girls who were daily smokers before and after
that nation imposed strict limits on all forms of tobacco advertising and
promotion. 16 In 1975, before advertising was restricted, twenty-three percent of fifteen-year-old boys and twenty-eight percent of fifteen-year-old
girls were daily smokers.161 In 1986, after the restrictions had been fully
implemented, the percentage of daily smokers had fallen to sixteen percent
Standing alone, this would suggest
and seventeen percent respectively.
that tight limits on advertising can reduce the incidence of teen smoking by
as much as twenty-five to forty percent.
But, of course, other cultural and legal changes were taking place in
Norway at the same time as the ban on tobacco advertising was put in place.
In particular, Norway imposed a large excise tax increase on cigarettes in
1980.163 Policy analysts, especially those with an economics orientation
rather than a public health background, tend to believe that price increases
have a more dramatic effect on smoking behavior than do advertising restrictions.' 64 It is therefore quite likely that these other changes in Norway
were at least partially responsible for the decline in underage smoking.
Thus, because it is not possible to run a controlled experiment that holds
these other changes constant while examining only the effect of advertising
restrictions, we have no way of calibrating how much impact advertising
restrictions actually have on teen smoking.
Notwithstanding the great difficulties in proving causality with any
precision, I think a persuasive case can be made that at least some causal
connection exists. A key fact about the tobacco market is that very few individuals take up smoking as adults. It is estimated that about ninety per-

children, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUNG PEOPLE: REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994).

159 FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,474-95.
160 FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,490-9 1.
161 See id. at 44,491.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Proposed "GlobalSettlement" of Tobacco Litigation: A
Policy Analysis, 11-17 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE SO-CALLED GLOBAL TOBACCO
SETTLEMENT: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997).
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cent of adult smokers started smoking before the age of eighteen. 165 This
means that the future market shares of the tobacco companies-and their
future profitability-are critically dependent on the number of persons who
start using their products as teens.
Teen behavior is notoriously driven by peer pressure and by a desire to
experience adult "rites of passage. ' t66 Thus, there would no doubt be substantial teen tobacco use in a world without tobacco advertising, just as
there is substantial teen use of marijuana in a world without marijuana advertising. Yet the tobacco companies are not run by fools. Those companies spend a staggering six billion dollars per year on marketing activities in
the U.S. 167 In an oligopolistic market for a product that attracts very few
new adult users, where brand loyalty is high, and where demand among established users is highly inelastic,1 68 it is reasonable to assume that the great
bulk of this money is being spent to attract new teenage users. The fact that
the most heavily advertised products
teens overwhelmingly prefer to smoke
169
tends to confirm this supposition.
Thus, there is reason to believe that there is at least some causal connection between advertising and smoking behavior. It is not the sole cause,
it is perhaps not the dominant cause, and the degree of causal influence
probably cannot be quantified. Still, curtailing the exposure of teens to
cartoon advertising, billboards, and promotional merchandise would probably contribute, in some measure, to a reduction in teen smoking. Whether
the courts will agree with this assessment will depend on what standard of
proof they apply, and on how willing they are to defer to the judgment of
entities like the FDA, which are convinced that there is such a connection.
3. The Private Value of Tobacco Advertising. The external benefits
and costs of tobacco advertising should be compared to the private value of
this advertising to the rightsholders, the tobacco companies. Here, there
would seem to be few conceptual difficulties, although informational shortcomings prevent any exact assessment. The private value to the tobacco
companies should be measured by their willingness to pay for such a right.
165 See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,573 (reporting survey data that 92% of 20 year-old
smokers started before age 18); id. at 44,574 (reporting finding that 82% of smokers aged 30 to 39 began
to smoke before age 18).
166See FDA NOPR, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,329.
167 See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,601.
168

On price elasticity, see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMPETITION AND THE FINANCIAL

IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED TOBACCO INDUSTRY SETTLEMENT 4-5 (1997) (demand for cigarettes is rela-

tively insensitive to price, with price elasticity generally reported to be -0.4); on brand loyalty, see Jon
D. Hanson et al., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for FederalRegulation of Cigarette
Manufacturers,22 S.ILL. U. L.J. 519, 534 n.48 (1998) (cigarettes have the highest known brand loyalty
of any consumer product).
169 See Richard W. Pollay et al., The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market
Shares Among Youths andAdults, 1979-1993,60 J. MARKETING 1 (1996).

1191

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Tobacco companies pay an astonishing amount for advertising-currently
six billion dollars per year. But this is not the correct measure of the private
value of the right. Advertising is valued not according to what it costs but
according to the profits it brings in-the additional revenues net of costs.
Thus, the correct measure of the PVcr of advertising is the profits the tobacco companies would lose if such advertising were banned. This is presumably just slightly more than what the companies would be willing to
pay to preserve the right to continue to engage in such advertising.17 0 In assessing this PVcr, it is also important to remember that neither the Global
Settlement nor the AG Settlement bans all tobacco advertising; both focus
on cartoons, billboards, and promotions most likely to appeal to teens.
One way to measure the private value of the prohibited advertising
would be to estimate the decline in profits that would occur once the advertising is banned. The lost profits would equal the private value of the advertising. This approach, of course, takes us back to the vexing issue of
what effect advertising 'restrictions will have on demand for cigarettes, as to
which we do not have very good data. A second method of valuation might
be to determine the internal benchmark rate of return on investment in the
tobacco industry, and apply this rate to investment in advertising, on the assumption that tobacco companies will demand that all investments realize
the benchmark rate of return. This approach would require that we estimate
the reduction in advertising investment that will occur as a result of the new
restrictions, as opposed to the reductiont7 tin smoking, as well as the companies' benchmark internal rate of return.
4. A Police Power Rule: The Final Accounting. What then is the
bottom line with respect to whether tobacco advertising should be constitutionally protected under the proposed framework? The answer, obviously,
is that we do not know. For sake of illustration, however, let us start with
some numbers taken from the FDA's cost-benefit analysis. 72 The FDA
computed the costs and benefits of its proposed advertising and marketing
restrictions using a variety of assumptions as to their effectiveness. The
170 A complete analysis should perhaps also include in PV. any returns earned by providers of inputs

to tobacco advertising in excess of their opportunity costs. Thus, for example, if advertising agencies can
earn S(X + Y) creating ads to induce smoking, but only $(X) creating antismoking ads, then $(Y)-the forgone economic rents of the advertising agencies from not being able to produce ads for cigarettes-should
be added as an element ofPV. I have ignored this complication here because I have no way of knowing if
there are such forgone opportunity costs and, if so, how large they might be. Also, the addition of this refinement would not change the bottom line, given that PGV, exceeds PV, by such a large magnitude.
171 The five-year average rate of return on investment in the tobacco industry is reported to be
17.01%. See Market Guide, Comparison Reportfor Philip Morris Companies (visited March 4, 1999)
<http://yahoo.marketguide.commgi/ratio17043N.html>.
172See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,568-99. Agencies such as FDA are required to perform a cost-benefit analysis of major rulemaking initiatives under Executive Order 12,866, the Clinton
Administration's version of Executive Order 12,291 issued by President Reagan.
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agency argued that its proposed package of marketing restrictions would reduce teen smoking by fifty percent, and that fifty percent of these teenagers
would continue to refrain from smoking as adults.'73 This is probably optimistic. Moreover, the advertising restrictions actually adopted by the AG
Settlement are significantly less restrictive overall than the FDA's restrictions. To be conservative, let us assume that the advertising restrictions
actually adopted will deter only ten percent of the teens in each age group
from smoking and that fifty percent of these teenagers will continue to refrain from smoking as adults. Under these assumptions, the FDA computed
that 12,000 smoking-related deaths would be avoided and 181,100 years of
life saved.' 74 After subtracting compliance and administrative costs, the
agency placed the monetized net present value of these benefits (using17the
S
OMB's discount rate of seven percent) at between $3.5 and $4.0 billion.
In order to compute the PGVCr associated with the extinction of advertising rights, we should also take into account any external benefits to consumers from cigarette advertising which will be lost because of the
restrictions. Given that hard information is not restricted and that magazine
and direct mail advertising is not restricted (except insofar as cartoon characters are banned), these external benefits are probably small. To err on the
side of generosity, let us assume that the advertising restricted by regulations would eliminate some consumer surplus. We can perhaps account for
this by selecting the low end of the FDA's estimate of the benefits of the restrictions. This yields a PGVcr of negative $3.5 billion for the tobacco advertising banned by the proposed settlement.
Under the formula for determining whether to apply a police power
rule (PGVr + PVcr < 0 or PGVr < - PVcr), it is necessary that this negative
to the
PGVcr more than offset the private value of the exercise of the right
tobacco companies (PVc,). Again, the uncertainties in determining PVr are
considerable. Let us again borrow from the FDA's analysis, however, and
attempt to derive a value for PVcr based on the predicted decline in sales,
assuming that the FDA's advertising restrictions deter ten percent of teenagers from starting to smoke, and fifty percent of those teenagers continue
not to smoke as adults. The FDA's cost-benefit analysis indicates that these
assumptions would translate into lost sales of 31.6 million packs of cigarettes in the first year, 56.4 million packs in the second year, 81.2 million
packs in the third year, 106 million packs in the fourth year, and so on.176
177
Using the current industry-average profitability of five cents per pack,

See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,569.
See id.
See id. at 44,598.
See FDA Final Reg., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44599. This assumes a 10% deterrence of teens rather
than the optimistic 50% taken by the FDA. See id.
177 See FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION, supra note 168, at 45 (table showing operating profits of
tobacco companies without settlement).
'73
'74
175
176
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this represents a profit loss of $1.58 million in the first year, $2.82 million
in the second year, $4.06 million the third year, and so forth. The disagain using OMB's
counted present value of this stream of lost profits,
178
million.
$113
about
is
rate,
discount
percent
seven
Clearly, the external costs associated with the restricted tobacco advertising, $3.5 billion, far exceed the private benefits of that advertising, $113
million. Indeed, under the above assumptions, it is not even close: the external costs are greater than the private benefits by a ratio of more than
twenty-five to one. The cause of this disparity has little to do with the assumptions about the effectiveness of the advertising restrictions. Instead, it
derives primarily from the fact that cigarettes are a product that is uniquely
devastating to people's health. Consequently, virtually any regulatory pol178

The discounted present value of the lost profits due to FDA-type advertising restrictions was

derived as follows:

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
TPV

Lost Sales
assuming
50%
effective
(million

Lost Sales
assuming
10%
effective
(million

packs)

packs)

158
282
406
530
654
778
902
1026
1150
1274
1398
1582
1646
1770
1894
2018
2142
2266
2390
2514

31.6
56.4
81.2
106.0
130.8
155.6
180.4
205.4
230.2
255.0
279.8
304.6
329.4
354.2
379.0
403.8
428.6
453.4
478.2
503.0

TPV = Total present value
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Lost Profit
Profit per (column 3 x
pack (FTC) column 4)
($ million)

$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05

1.58
2.82
4.06
5.30
6.54
7.78
9.02
10.27
11.51
12.75
13.99
15.23
16.47
17.71
18.95
21.19
21.43
22.67
23.91
25.15

PV (using
7%
discount
rate)

1.48
2.46
3.31
4.04
4.66
5.18
5.62
5.98
6.26
6.48
6.65
6.76
6.83
6.87
6.87
6.78
6.78
6.71
6.61
6.50
112.85
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icy that reduces the incidence of smoking even to a modest degree will be
cost-justified compared to the profits that can be derived from advertising
the product. Thus, I would submit that a police power rule is fully justified.
This analysis, of course, is subject to many objections about the choice
of assumptions and relative magnitudes. No doubt, if we were to re-do the
analysis and substitute Viscusi's estimate of the external costs of smoking
for the FDA's estimate of the costs of smoking to teens, which assumes that
future medical costs and lost years of life are externalities to the immature
teen, the estimate of the PGVcr of tobacco advertising would be much
smaller. Also, if we assume that the advertising restrictions will be highly
effective in discouraging smokers, then the PVcr would be much larger because the tobacco companies would lose more profits. With enough adjustments, conceivably the case could be made that a police power rule is
not justified here. Additional data would reduce the uncertainties in this
exercise to a degree. But as noted earlier, the conceptual and normative issues that divide the FDA and Hansen and Logue from the economists Manning and Viscusi are the largest source of the variance in outcomes.
Clearly, therefore, the case for a police power rule for tobacco advertising is contestable. On assumptions that I regard as reasonable, the
framework would suggest that this is the correct solution-advertising restrictions limited to demand-inducing features likely to influence teens
should be deemed constitutional under the First Amendment. On other assumptions that cannot be dispositively rejected, however, the framework
conceivably could suggest that tobacco advertising should be constitutionally protected.
B. A PropertyRule?
Regardless of what the framework indicates about the propriety of a
police power solution, there are reasons to press ahead with the analysis of
other aspects of the transaction structure. The courts will most likely assess
advertising restrictions under the case-by-case CentralHudson test, and the
question of whether tobacco advertising restrictions can be sustained under
that test is highly uncertain. The FDA has vigorously argued both in its
rule-making and in court that its advertising regulations are constitutional
under CentralHudson. But the consensus of the legal commentators seems
to be179 that these restrictions cannot survive scrutiny under Central Hudson, or at least that theycannot survive under CentralHudson as reinterpreted by 44 Liquormart.

179 See, e.g., Gregory D. Bassuk, Note, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights:A Constitutional
Analysis of Tobacco Advertising Restrictions in a FederalLegislative Settlement of Tobacco Industry
Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 715 (1997) (proposed Global Settlement provisions on advertising unconstitutional under CentralHudson); Howard IC Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 432 (1997) (FDA regulations unconstitutional under proper application
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Moreover, the disquiet about the CentralHudson test on display in 44
Liquormartmay reflect a growing consensus among the Justices in favor of
a more "categorical" and a less case-by-case approach to commercial
speech restrictions. Specifically, the Court may limit permissible commercial speech restrictions to those designed to curb false or misleading advertising and advertising for illegal products or services.18 I would argue that
the example of demand-inducing cigarette advertising demonstrates the unwisdom of such a limited rule. But the Court may conclude that other considerations-such as desire for more easily administered and predictable
rules-outweigh the advantages of case-by-case weighing of external costs
and benefits. Such a jurisprudential commitment on the part of the Court
would render advertising restrictions of the type adopted by the FDA and
contained in the AG Settlement unconstitutional. Thus, there is ample reason to proceed to a consideration of transactional options other than the police power rule.
Which brings us then to our next question: whether the tobacco companies should be allowed to waive their right to engage in tobacco advertising. This inquiry is more easily answered than the question of whether
tobacco advertising should be subject to a police power rule.
Under current constitutional law, the answer to the waiver question
would be governed by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. A common
understanding of the doctrine is that it protects individuals against entering
into improvident or unfair contracts to waive their constitutional rights. In
other words, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is designed to invali82
date contracts that do not reflect a genuine exercise of individual consent.
If we regard the waiver issue in this light, there would seem to be no reason
to invalidate the waiver of commercial speech rights by the major tobacco
companies. These companies are perhaps endowed with more legal advice
of CentralHudson); but see David C. Vladeck & John Cary Sims, Why the Supreme Court Will Uphold
Strict Controls on Tobacco Advertising, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 651 (1998) (proposed Global Settlement provisions constitutional under CentralHudson); Matthew L. Miller, Note, The FirstAmendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and CigaretteAdvertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1985) (blanket ban of
cigarette advertising unconstitutional under Central Hudson but restriction narrowly tailored to advertising likely to reach children permissible).
150 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,and FreeSpeech: The Implications of44
Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123. Other commentators argue that such restrictions should be
deemed unconstitutional if we return to first principles. See Redish, supra note 157, at 637 (noting that
the constitutionality of tobacco advertising restrictions is uncertain under CentralHudson, but that from
the "broad normative perspective of free speech theory" they should be held unconstitutional); David A.
Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, andFreedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (suggesting
that restrictions on cigarette advertising violate the core principle that government "may not suppress
speech on the ground that it is too persuasive").
11 See supranotes 101-15 and accompanying text.
182 See Fudenberg, supranote 31, at 410-13 (common justification for doctrine rests on assumption that waivers of rights are coerced); Sullivan, supra note 31, at 1419 (a traditional justification rests
on concern about coercion).
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about their constitutional rights than any other entities in the world. 8 3 If
they decide that it makes sense to waive their First Amendment rights in
return for relief from tort liability or other benefits, it cannot be because
they do not understand their rights or the implications of waiving those
rights, or because the government has exerted "undue influence" on their
decisionmaking. Indeed, few corporate actions were more carefully deliberated than the decision of the major tobacco companies to enter into the
proposed Global Settlement and, when that failed, the AG Settlement. The
same will presumably be true of any future settlement or other agreement,
perhaps with the federal government, in which the companies agree to
waive their commercial speech rights.
As I have argued elsewhere, however, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should not be understood as being grounded in a concern about
volitional consent. 8 4 The reason why consent should not be dispositive can
be illustrated by considering waivers of political speech rights by tobacco
companies. This is not a hypothetical. As part of the recent AG Settlement,
the tobacco companies agreed not only to waive their First Amendment
commercial speech rights insofar as they apply to the advertising restrictions included in the agreement. They also agreed to waive their First
Amendment rights to object to certain types of legislation that may be proposed in the future. With respect to an enumerated list of legislative proposals, 18 5 the tobacco companies pledged not to "oppose, or cause to be
opposed (including through any third party or Affiliate), the passage by
such Settling State (or any political subdivision thereof) of those state or local legislative proposals or administrative rules."'8 6 This proposal is, un183 See Frankel, supranote 16 (tobacco companies were represented in settlement negotiations by

high-powered litigation and settlement specialists).
184See Merrill, supra note 34.
185 The types of legislation covered by the waiver are listed in the AG Settlement, Exhibit F,
which reads as follows:
EXHIBIT F
POTENTIAL LEGISLATION NOT TO BE OPPOSED
Limitations on Youth access to vending machines.
Inclusion of cigars within the definition of tobacco products.
Enhancement of enforcement efforts to identify and prosecute violations of laws prohibiting retail
sales to Youth.
Encouraging or supporting use of technology to increase effectiveness of age-of-purchase laws, such
as, without limitation, the use of programmable scanners, scanners to read drivers' licenses, or use of
other age/ID data banks.
Limitations on promotional programs for non-tobacco products as prizes or giveaways.
Enforcement of access restrictions through penalties on Youth possession or use.
Limitations on tobacco product advertising in or on school facilities, or wearing of tobacco logo
merchandise in or on school property.
Limitations on non-tobacco products which are designed to look like tobacco products, such as bubble gum cigars, candy cigarettes, etc.

16 Id.art. III(m).
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abashedly, a partial waiver of core First Amendment rights to engage in
future political speech.
Obviously, there can be no argument that the tobacco companies'
waiver of political speech rights was not "knowingly and intelligently" consented to by the tobacco companies. The political speech waiver, like the
commercial speech waiver, was made on advice of counsel and after extensive deliberation. Clearly, the tobacco companies concluded that it was in
their best interest to waive their political speech rights to oppose the enumerated categories of legislation as part of a package of quid pro quos that
included the AG's agreement to drop all pending and future cost-recovery
litigation against the tobacco companies.
Nevertheless, I think a compelling argument can be made that such
political speech waivers should not be enforced. As the Supreme Court
noted in FirstNationalBank ofBoston v. Belotti,'8 7 "[t]he inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual."' 88 Indeed, one can readily imagine how the purchased silence
of the tobacco companies with respect to future legislative proposals could
deprive the public of important input about such proposals. For example, a
proposed law mandating the use of "programmable scanners" to read drivers's licenses or other types of identification before cigarettes may be purchased18 9 might raise troubling privacy questions. If tobacco companies
had not waived their political speech rights, they might raise such concerns
in public debate over whether to adopt such a measure. However, with the
tobacco companies sitting silently on the sidelines, it is not clear that other
organizations would have sufficient resources or incentives to stimulate
public awareness of these issues.
Under the transaction structure theory proposed herein, the question
whether a constitutional right is protected by an inalienability rule or a
property rule turns on whether the exercise of the right has a large and positive PGVr. For reasons already canvassed, there is reason to believe that
political speech in the aggregate provides important benefits to third parties.
Moreover, it is clear that such speech is entitled to a high level of protection
on a categorical basis. This suggests that it would be inappropriate to engage in an inquiry into whether the PGVcr of such speech in any particular
case is sufficiently small that a waiver should be permitted. Political
speech, including political speech by tobacco companies, should be governed by an inalienability rule.
With respect to commercial speech, however, it is less likely that waivers of speech rights would deprive consumers of important information.
For the reasons previously given, the external benefits of commercial ad187 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
188 Id. at 777.

189 See supranote 185.
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vertising are, as a general matter, low. Moreover, the proposed regulations
do not interfere with the dissemination of price information, new product
information, and comparative safety claims-advertising most likely to entail external benefits. Thus, any external benefits associated with the restricted tobacco advertising are likely to be insignificant. In determining
the overall magnitude of PGVrr, it is necessary to subtract the external costs
of the exercise of the right from the external benefits. The magnitude of the
external costs of tobacco advertising, as we have seen, is highly uncertain.
But on almost any reckoning, those costs are likely to be at least as large as
the external benefits. As long as EBcr < ECcr, then PGVcr is either zero or
negative, making property rule protection, rather than an inalienability rule,
appropriate. 90
It follows that there is no reason why the tobacco companies should be
prohibited from waiving their commercial speech rights, as opposed to their
political speech rights. Those rights should be at most protected by a property rule, which the tobacco companies would be free to sell to government
at a mutually satisfactory negotiated price.
C. A LiabilityRule?
Suppose that the proposed advertising restrictions are found to be unconstitutional, and suppose further that the tobacco companies are permitted
to waive their right to challenge those restrictions. What happens if the tobacco companies cannot be induced to execute further waivers beyond the
waiver already achieved in the AG Settlement? If further regulation of tobacco advertising is desired, it would seem that we are left with only one
option: condemnation of the tobacco companies' advertising rights.
As suggested in Part I, a liability rule should be available if the following three conditions are met: (1) the rightsholder has a monopoly over
something that the government needs to acquire to fulfill its objectives;
(2) compensation rather than a police power rule is appropriate, either because the rightsholder is blameless or because the rightsholder has already
been determined to have a constitutionally protected right; and (3) the right
in question can be objectively valued in monetary terms. Let us briefly
consider whether tobacco advertising satisfies each of these conditions.

In advocating the use of an inalienability rule with respect to political speech rights, I am obviously advocating a "categorical" rule for all types of political speech. Similarly, I am inclined to take the
categorical position that constitutionally protected commercial speech should always be subject to a property rule, if not a liability rule, because the external benefits of such speech will likely be small. This is in
contrast to the case-by-case approach I have advocated for determining whether commercial speech regulations are justified under a police power rule. There is no contradiction in these positions, however. My advocacy of categorical rules simply reflects my belief that most cases within the category would be decided
the same way if case-by-case inquiries were undertaken. In contrast, where the outcomes of individual
cases within a category are likely to differ, a case-by-case approach makes greater sense.
190
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1. The Presence of Monopoly. The governmental objective reflected
in the FDA rules and the two settlements is to reduce the incidence of underage smoking. No one anticipates that the level will be driven to zero. It
might seem, therefore, that the governmental objective could be pursued by
achieving a reduction in advertising rather than an elimination of advertising. This, in turn, suggests that the government could purchase advertising
waivers from different manufacturers without having to worry about acquiring the rights from every manufacturer. In other words, tobacco advertising might be viewed like too many push-cart vendors in the downtown
area. T' There is no monopoly holdout problem, since it does not matter
which push-cart vendors sell their rights. Without any monopoly holdout
problem, there is no need to move from property rules to liability rules.
Unfortunately, given the dynamics of the tobacco market, the strategy
of purchasing the advertising rights of only some tobacco companies is unlikely to work. As noted earlier, the basic marketing strategy of the tobacco
companies is to try to snare as large a share of the teenage market as possible, because this is the age at which individuals begin to smoke and form
brand loyalties. Thus, if the government secures a preliminary agreement
from four tobacco companies to curb advertising designed to appeal to teens
but a fifth company refuses to go along, the first four companies will almost
certainly bail out of the deal. This is because the prospect of one company
being able to use color and image advertising would give that company an
unfair advantage in capturing future market share. It follows that purchasing less than all the rights in the market will not do. The government will
have to achieve unanimous consent among the companies in order to eliminate tobacco advertising through voluntary agreement.
The requirement of obtaining the unanimous consent of all rightsholders means that the first condition for utilizing liability rules rather than
property rules has been satisfied. Because all must consent, each tobacco
company has the power to hold out and frustrate the government's objective
by raising the transaction costs of achieving a voluntary exchange of rights
to unacceptably high levels. The presence of such high transaction costs, in
turn, justifies recourse to liability rules in order to achieve the desired end.
2. Whether Compensation Should be Required. Although the presence
of high transaction costs justifies shifting from a property rule to a liability
rule, it is also necessary to explain why a shift all the way to a rule of no
entitlement is not the appropriate solution. I earlier suggested the following
reasons' 92 why such a shift might be regarded as improper: (1) although
exercise of the constitutional right generates external costs in excess of external benefits and private benefits, the rightsholder is perceived as being
blameless for these external costs; or (2) the rightsholder has already been
191
192
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determined to have a protected constitutional right, perhaps because the
courts have committed to a categorical rule of constitutional protection.
The first reason is unlikely to strike much of a responsive chord in this
context. Few objective observers would characterize the tobacco companies as innocent purveyors of innocuous commercial messages that, through
no fault of their own, just happen to induce teenagers to start smoking.
The second reason, however, could easily become relevant if the Supreme Court adopts the position of Justices Stevens and Thomas that commercial speech, with the exception of deceptive advertising and advertising
for illegal products and services, is entitled to full constitutional protection.' 93 Such a bright-line categorical rule might be justified on the grounds
that it covers the principal examples of advertising that generates external
costs in excess of its benefits, and the administrative costs and error costs of
permitting judges to try to identify other examples through case-by-case inquiry are too high. The erection of such a doctrinal regime would place the
police power solution to restriction of nondeceptive advertising off limits,
even if in individual cases like tobacco advertising the social costs of a particular type of advertising far exceed its benefits. The only options that
would remain for dealing with the problem would be a government purchase of a waiver of rights or, failing unanimous agreement, government
condemnation of advertising rights.
The previous discussion of the external costs and benefits of cigarette
advertising 94 suggests an additional reason, not anticipated in the initial
presentation of the general framework, why a liability rule might be preferred to a police power rule. If the courts are very uncertain about the correct analysis of external costs and benefits, a liability rule provides a
mechanism for assuring that the correct conclusion has been drawn. Under
a liability rule, the government must compensate the rightsholder for the
private value of exercising the constitutional right. Insofar as the government seeks to obtain the maximum benefit from its expenditure of public
funds, the government will condemn and compensate only if the social
benefits of extinguishing the right exceed the private value of the right.
Thus, the government will condemn and compensate only when it is socially efficient to do so. In this sense, the liability rule solution can be justified for reasons that parallel the arguments found in the conventional
explication of the C&M framework about why a rule of strict liability in tort
may be superior to a rule that requires the court to enjoin the defendant to
operate in a socially efficient manner.195
Thus, our consideration of the problem of tobacco advertising uncovers
another qualification to the basic framework, in the form of an additional
193See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
194 See supranotes 147-68 and accompanying text.
195 In the takings literature, this is referred to as the "fiscal illusion" argument for compensation.
See Merrill, supra note 34, at 882-86.
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reason to use liability rules: those rules may be particularly appropriate
where there is a high level of uncertainty about whether a police power rule
should apply. Making the government pay for the extinction of rights provides an additional assurance that the government is not overusing its police
power in socially undesirable ways.
3. Objective Measurement in Money. Perhaps the most difficult hurdle
to overcome in justifying the use of a liability rule to acquire the commercial speech rights of tobacco companies is the requirement that the right be
susceptible to objective valuation in monetary terms. Real estate, the most
common subject of the power of eminent domain, nearly always has an ascertainable market value, and this acts as a constraint on jury discretion in
making ex post awards of damages. Other property rights and contract
rights may also be amenable to valuation using market values as a benchmark. The right to advertise, in contrast, is not a recognized property right,
and does not have a readily determinable market value.
This is not necessarily a fatal objection, however. There are instances
where holders of property rights with no market value have been held to be
entitled to just compensation upon a taking of those rights by the government.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that trade secrets taken by the government through a regulatory scheme mandating disclosure are entitled to
compensation even though such secrets have no readily available market
value.196 When the government takes rights that do not have an established
market value, it has been suggested that compensation can be determined in
other ways, such as the income capitalization method, which "estimates the
useful economic
value of a stream of income that property produces over its197
life by capitalizing that stream in terms of its present value."'
In principle, it should be possible to deploy such techniques to place a
value on a tobacco company's right to advertise. To be sure, it would be
necessary to obtain proprietary information about each company's return on
investment in advertising, or on the profits it has lost because of the imposition of certain advertising restrictions. But in a condemnation proceeding,
it would be appropriate to place the burden on each company to produce
such information as a condition of obtaining compensation. Thus, the objective valuation hurdle can perhaps be overcome in this context, even
without established market values for the right in question.
The ability to put a monetary value on commercial speech rights reminds us that commercial advertising has always had a dual nature: part
commerce and part speech, or really both at once. The Supreme Court of
late has been stressing the speech part and insisting on greater measures of
196 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). See also United States v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (condemnation of flowage easement).
197Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of CopyrightedProperty: The Sovereign s Prerogative,67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 720 (1989).
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constitutional protection for advertising, thereby frustrating government attempts at regulation. But the fact that commercial speech is susceptible to
valuation in money terms reflects the fact that it remains a part of commerce. The commerce side of commercial speech renders it, unlike many
other constitutional rights, subject to government condemnation. 198
CONCLUSION

Virtually every nation in the world is free to adopt, as one element of
its strategy for combating tobacco use, regulations designed to restrict demand-inducing advertising. A construction of the First Amendment that
permits restrictions only of deceptive advertising and advertising for illegal
products-as proposed by Justice Thomas and perhaps Justice Stevenswould, in effect, remove this as a regulatory option in the United States.
The government would be forced into one of two polar positions: either
making tobacco use illegal and thereby permitting restrictions of
nondeceptive tobacco advertising, or continuing to allow adults to use
tobacco products legally and thereby permitting unrestricted promotion of
tobacco products.
Forcing the government to choose between these two extremes eliminates the obvious intermediate option: legalizing tobacco products but restricting their promotion. Perhaps the most intuitive way to make the
argument in favor of permitting regulation of demand-inducing advertising
for tobacco products is to consider the case of narcotics. Many thoughtful
people have urged at least a partial deregulation of these substances. But
under the commercial speech regime proposed by Justices Thomas and
Stevens, such a move would mean that the purveyors of legalized marijuana
or h~roin would have the right to put up color billboards in inner city
neighborhoods, run ads using cartoon characters in magazines, and otherwise tout the use of narcotics. Similar points could be made about a policy
of legalizing prostitution, as in Nevada, or decriminalizing other traditional
types of "vice activity."
From a policy perspective, this regulatory straightjacket makes little
sense. If cigarettes were introduced today, knowing what we know about
them as a product, there is little doubt that they would be banned. And any
198 One danger of using condemnation in the context of advertising for a product like cigarettes
having a high demand inelasticity is that the government may tum around and impose a tax on the activity
in order to pay the 'Just compensation" for the extinction of the speech right. Clearly, it would be inappropriate for the government to condemn half of someone's land for a highway and then raise property taxes on
the remainder of the land to pay for the taking. This would be an end run around the requirement of just
compensation. Similarly, it might be inappropriate for the government to raise excise taxes on cigarettes by
the exact amount needed to pay just compensation for the extinction of tobacco advertising rights. Given
the courts' reluctance to engage in much analysis of tax incidences, however, the government might be able
to do something closely approximating this through step transactions, i.e., by first adopting a general increase in the excise tax with the proceeds payable to the Treasury, then condemning the advertising rights
and paying just compensation out of general appropriations. As long as the government was not too blatant
about what it was doing, courts might be reluctant to police against this.
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advertising for them would thus also be banned, and this would be constitutional under the Thomas/Stevens commercial speech theory. Unfortunately,
because smoking is so deeply entrenched in our society-there are so many
millions of people who cannot kick the habit-there is no prospect in the
foreseeable future that the sale of cigarettes will be banned. But this quirk
of history should not require us to tie our hands in taking reasonable steps
to minimize smoking and reduce the number of future smokers. Reasonable regulation of advertising such as the prohibition on cartoons and billboards adopted in the AG Settlement can play a constructive role in this
process. Further regulation, including restricting all print advertising to
black-on-white tombstone formats, should also be considered.
Moreover, outside the world of First Amendment theology, it is not
necessarily true, as Justice Thomas has argued, that alternatives less burdensome on commercial speech are always preferable to advertising restrictions. The obvious "less burdensome" option for tobacco products is a
steep excise tax increase, which would depress demand and consumption,
especially among youth. But such an option would impose severe hardships on many poor adults, including large numbers of elderly smokers who
live on fixed pensions. For many of these persons, raising the price of cigarettes a dollar a pack is not going to change a lifetime of behavior. What it
will mean, instead, is something on the order of a one thousand dollar annual tax increase, which will be adsorbed by purchasing less food or prescription medicines. Given the choice between a one thousand dollar tax
increase and not being able to see Joe Camel on billboards, I have no doubt
what most of these hopelessly addicted elderly smokers would choose.
Fortunately, even if the Supreme Court blocks the door to direct prohibition of demand-inducing tobacco advertising, our constitutional structure
is sufficiently flexible that there may be other avenues to achieving sensible
results. One permissible possibility is to regulate tobacco advertising as
part of a settlement between tobacco companies and other affected parties,
in which the tobacco companies contractually pledge to waive their First
Amendment rights. Another possibility, which is more daring but I think
also justifiable, is to condemn the tobacco companies' right to advertise in
return for the payment of just compensation. The Constitution, it turns out,
is a cathedral of many dimensions. Its offers us not only protected and unprotected activities, but also inalienability rules, property rules, and liability
rules. Property rules and liability rules may be called upon for new service
in the years ahead.
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